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ABSTRACT

Author: Xiong, Aiping. Ph.D.
Institution: Purdue University
Degree Received: December 2017
Title: Roles of Time Perception and Expected Action Effects in Selecting Delayed
Outcomes From Description and Experience
Major Professor: Robert W. Proctor
In everyday life, many action outcomes and the information associated with them (e.g.,
the receiving time or probability) can be learned through description or experience.
Experimental studies of choice behavior document distinct, and sometimes
contradictory, deviations from maximization. For example, when people make decisions
from described probabilities, they tend to overweight rare events. In contrast, when
people make decisions from experienced outcomes, they tend to exhibit the opposite
bias. People’s experience is always sequential and extended in time, whereas one-shot
descriptions are not. Typically, the chance of something happening relies on individuals’
sampling from the past experience, indicating a probabilistic waiting. Thus, time itself
may be an inherent and fundamental dimension that distinguishes risky choice selections
on the basis of experience from those made on the basis of description. Choices
involving delayed outcomes and choices involving probabilistic outcomes have been
understood within the discounting framework and are well described by the same
hyperboloid function. To the extent that a single function describes risky choice and
delayed choice from description, one might expect that the way in which information is
processed for risky choice from experience may also be similar to the choice selection
associated with delays. The current study focused on delayed rewards selection,
shedding light on a mental number line account for the temporal discounting and
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intertemporal preference differences across description and experience. I examined how
temporal interval perception and expected action effects contribute or interact to support
choice selection. Five laboratory experiments were conducted with introductory
psychology students. Using a description paradigm, Experiments 1 and 2 revealed a
temporal discounting in the seconds time-level. Using a within-subject design,
Experiment 3 evaluated the temporal discounting as a function of decision type (i.e.,
decision from description vs. decision from experience). A description-experience gap
was evident as predicted that expected affective outcomes mainly drove the delayedrewards selection from experience. In Experiment 4, different participants completed the
same task as in Experiment 3 but with prospective instructions of a memory test to
promote the accurate encoding of temporal intervals. The description-experience gap
was also evident. Experiment 5 used an acoustic action effect to promote temporal delay
retrieval during action selection, which showed minimum effect on reducing the
description-experience gap. Based on the combined findings in choice selection,
decision time, and memory test, a mental number line account is proposed that explains
the temporal discounting and the description-experience gap in terms of time
representation. This account suggests that the mental number line may be responsible for
the probability discounting and the description-experience gap of risky choices as well.

1

INTRODUCTION

Typically, in the behavioral-decision paradigm, each option and its related
information (e.g., probabilities) are presented, and then participants are required to make
a selection. Thereby, decisions are made from description. There is no doubt of such
convenient summary description of options in everyday life, such as weather forecasts
commonly present outcomes and probabilities (Gigerenzer, Hertwig, Van Den Broek,
Fasolo, & Katsikopoulos, 2005). However, for most behaviors, people do not enjoy the
convenience of stated outcomes, let alone other associated information. Instead, people
must rely on the experience they have had to select actions, making decisions based on
experience (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003).
Recent research on decision-making under risk that takes the role of experience
into account has consistently demonstrated that decisions from description and decisions
from experience can lead to dramatically different choice behavior (e.g., Hertwig,
Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). In the case of decisions from description, people make
choices as if they overweight the probability of rare events, as described by prospect
theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In contrast, in the case of decisions from
experience, people make choices as if they underweight the probability of rare events.
The contrasting observations describe how the mind functions in two different
informational environments. To improve the understanding of how representations of
information shape actions, it is necessary to study the gap between description- and
experience-based action selection beyond the risky choice.
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I am concerned with the differences in description- and experience-based action
selection from a temporal perspective. Choice between delayed rewards, like choice
between probabilistic rewards, involves outcomes that differ on more than one
dimension. That is, just as the latter may involve choosing between a smaller, less risky
reward and a larger, more risky reward, the former may involve choosing between a
smaller, sooner reward and a larger, later reward. Moreover, just as an individual may
choose the larger, risky reward when the probabilities of receiving either reward are very
low, an individual may choose the larger, later reward when the alternatives are both
well in the future. For example, one might prefer $100 right now rather than $120 a
month from now. Nevertheless, if the choice were between $100 in 1 year and $120 in
13 months, then one might choose $120.
People discount the value of an outcome when the delay until its receipt increases
-- a finding known collectively as temporal discounting (Green, Fristoe, & Myerson,
1994). Individuals reverse their preference because the subjective value of smaller,
sooner rewards increases more than that of larger, later rewards when there is an
equivalent decrease in the delays to the two rewards. Such preference reversal is similar
to the Allais paradox in economics (Allais, 1979) and in prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979). Individuals value outcomes more highly when they occur with certainty
than when they appear in a probabilistic situation. Given the similar discounting
functions between risky and delayed outcomes in decision-making from description
(Green & Myerson, 2004; Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, & Cross, 1987), a question naturally
arises: Is the description-experience gap of risky choice also evident for delayed choice?
Moreover, if the gap is evident, which factors contribute to the description-experience
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gap? Do the same or different underlying processes account for probabilistic and
temporal description-experience differences? The answers to these questions are
important and will improve understanding of how people respond to events that are
distal but consequential and how people make action selection with outcomes that differ
on multiple dimensions.
The Description-Experience Gap in Risky Choice
In the behavioral decision-making literature, choice between monetary gambles
has been used for risky choice, assuming that outcomes and associated probabilities have
the same properties as gambles (e.g., Allais, 1979; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Within
a description paradigm, the choice task typically consists of two monetary gambles with
explicitly stated outcomes and their probabilities within several problems. Each problem
offers a choice between a risky option with two outcomes (e.g., Get $4 with probability
of 0.8, $0 otherwise) and a safe option (Get $3 for sure).
Nevertheless, when people decide whether to take out a loan or contemplate the
acceptance of a paper submission, there are no risk tables to consult. Instead, individuals
need to rely on whatever experience they have had with those choices, making decisions
based on experience rather than on description (Hertwig et al., 2004; Luce & Suppes,
1965; see Hertwig, 2015, for a review). In research on decisions from experience (e.g.,
Hertwig et al., 2004), participants acquire information about outcomes and probabilities
by making repeated choices and receiving feedback about the outcomes of their choices.
Specifically, two buttons are presented on a computer screen, each of which represents
an initially unknown payoff distribution. Clicking a button results in a random draw
from the respective distribution. For example, selecting button A could lead to outcomes
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of $4 or $0. In contrast, selecting button B would always result in an outcome of $3.
Participants acquire knowledge about the two distributions by choosing between the
buttons and experiencing the contingency among choices and outcomes over repeated
trials.
Typically, decisions from experience are investigated with three different
paradigms: 1) the sampling paradigm, in which people first sample as many outcomes as
they wish and at the end of each problem, participants are asked to select the button to
draw from once for real (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004); 2) the full-feedback paradigm, in
which a limited number of draws (typically 100) contribute to participants’ earnings and
they receive draw-by-draw feedback on both the selected and unselected options (e.g.,
Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2006); 3) the partial-feedback paradigm, which is identical to
the full-feedback paradigm except that participants learn about the selected payoffs only
(e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003).
Regardless of the different experimental paradigms, a robust and systematic
description-experience gap has emerged in numerous studies. A smaller portion of
participants choose risky options when provided a description of two options (e.g., 20%
in Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), whereas a larger portion of participants select risky
options in the decisions from experience (e.g., 88% in Hertwig et al., 2004, see their
Table 2 Decision problem 1). A tendency to select the risky options when the desirable
outcome occurs with high probability (e.g., Get $4 with probability of 0.8, $0 otherwise;
or get $3 for sure) and to select the safe option when the desirable outcome occurs with
low probability (e.g., Get $4 with probability of 0.2, $0 otherwise; or get $3 with a
probability of 0.25) is evident in decisions from experience but is reversed in decisions
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from description (Hertwig et al., 2004). Thus, in decisions from experience people
behave as if the rare events have less impact than they deserve according to their
objective probabilities, whereas in decisions from description people behave as if the
rare events have more impact than they deserve.
Although the description-experience gap has been replicated consistently, there is
still disagreement as to the causes of the gap. Several possible causes have been
identified that may be contributing to the description-experience gap of risky choice.
One explanation is a reliance on small sampling, for which the probability experienced
in a sample is smaller than the event’s objective probability (Fox & Hadar, 2006).
However, reliance on a small sample cannot be the reason behind the descriptionexperience gap in the full feedback paradigm, in which the impact of a rare event is
attenuated even after a hundred trials with feedback.
Another factor that could underlie the description-experience gap, especially in
the feedback paradigm, is that people inform their decisions by recruiting recent and past
experiences acquired in similar situations (e.g., Gonzalez, Lerch, & Lebiere, 2003).
Furthermore, reliance on similar experience is an effective heuristic in dynamic
environments (e.g., Biele, Erev, & Ert, 2009). For example, when doctors need to
diagnose the illness of patients from signs and symptoms, they appear to retrieve from
memory similar instances from the past. Nevertheless, some studies of decisions from
experience did not find traces of recency. For example, Camilleri and Newell (2011 )
asked participants to sample from a “block of trials” in which each block represented a
random order of outcomes that perfectly matched the described probabilities, such as in
a block of 10 outcomes a rare event with a probability of 0.2 occurred twice. This
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blockwise manipulation ensured that early and late trials were similar, which made it
difficult to detect the order effects in memory. Camilleri and Newell found a much
diminished gap between decisions from description and experience, suggesting the gap
is largely a result of non-equivalent information described externally and represented
internally, i.e., sampling biases.
Besides sampling errors, a coupling between search policy and decision strategy
was proposed to explain the description-experience gap of risky choice (Hills &
Hertwig, 2010). Specifically, Hill and Hertwig found that individuals who oscillated
between payoff distributions, chose options yielding better rewards from each round,
showing a pattern consistent with giving less weight to rare events. In contrast, people
who sampled extensively from one distribution, and then extensively from the other,
chose the distribution in which the rewards promised to be higher, showing less
inclination to underweight rare events. Furthermore, Wulff, Hills, and Hertwig (2015)
found that people adjust their search policy as a function of their long-term or short-term
goals (also see Camilleri & Newell, 2013). When decisions were framed in the long run
(aggregated outcomes extended over time), people maximized the expected value other
than median payoff, reducing the description-experience gap. Note that the “block of
trials” manipulation (Camilleri & Newell, 2011) discussed previously also affords such
kind of long-run frame. In everyday life, the chance of something happening is repeated
until the event actually happens, also called probabilistic waiting (Vanderveldt, Green, &
Rachlin, 2017). Together with the effect of long-run frame, the temporal dimension may
be critical for the description-experience gap of risky choice.
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So far, research on the description-experience gap has focused on risky choices.
However, not only probability but many kinds of information can be learned through
experience or description. The similar discounting functions for delayed and risky choice
in description (e.g., Green & Myerson, 2004) suggest that the shift from overweighting
to underweighting of rare events may also be evident between description- and
experience-based delayed events. Furthermore, the investigation of the descriptionexperience gap from a temporal perspective will shed light on the common causes of the
gap, which may also improve the understanding of the gap of risky choice.
The Temporal Discounting Function
Time is another important dimension when people make decisions. Specifically,
the temporal interval until a beneficial outcome is received can be viewed as a cost and
weighted against the benefit of the outcome. When facing the dilemma of an immediate
$100 or later $120 reward, some individuals may choose the immediate $100 option
since the delayed $120 is said to have less present or subjective value than the immediate
$100. Nevertheless, if the choice were between $100 in 1 year and $120 in 13 months,
then one might choose $120. The process by which outcomes lose subjective value as
the delay to their receipt increases is termed temporal discounting (see Figure 1; for a
review, see Green & Myerson, 2004).
Most previous studies conducted in the laboratory using a variety of procedures
have demonstrated the occurrence of preference reversals (Green & Myerson, 2004). It
should be noted, however, that those studies have used a description paradigm.
Specifically, the amounts of larger and smaller rewards and the available time of each
reward were presented to the participants in numbers simultaneously. Thus, those
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decisions involve participants’ prior knowledge of the representations of the amounts
and delays. The time-perception literature has shown an opposite pattern between
experienced- and recalled-temporal intervals. For example, you may feel that time flies
when you are having fun but a watched pot never boils, whereas the perceived duration
estimate is generally greater for more information or salient stimulus events than for
“empty” intervals (Fraisse, 1984; Zakay, 1989). Therefore, it is possible that there is a
description-experience gap for the delayed choice.
Few studies of temporal discounting have had participants experience the
duration of the delays and the reward amounts (Jimura, Myerson, Hilgard, Braver, &
Green, 2009; Jimura et al., 2011; Lagorio & Madden, 2005). Although the reward delays
and amounts were experienced in those studies, participants still were told explicitly the
amounts and delays before the experience, which may explain why the obtained results
were similar to decisions from description. To the best of my knowledge, to date, there is
no published study with humans in which the temporal discounting from description was
compared to temporal discounting without specifically stated delays.
Another issue that arises with respect to the prior research on temporal
discounting concerns the length of the delays used in the experiments. One might
question whether individuals are capable of making reliable or valid decisions regarding
the outcome of events that will not occur for a few months or a number of years. The
range of those delays conforms to that of some decisions, such as those regarding
financial investments with very delayed outcomes (how much money to spend now vs.
how much to save for retirement, etc.). However, the length of delays in a much smaller
range, such as minutes or seconds time-level, should also be examined because those
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smaller delays are encountered often in people’s daily lives. For example, do DiDi
drivers, those for a popular ride-sharing app in China, prefer to select a customer who is
2 minutes away with a 4-mile trip or another customer who is 4 minutes away with a 6mile trip? Or do Uber riders prefer a $15.94 ride with a 5-min wait or a $9.81 ride with a
10- min wait?
Temporal Interval Perception
Time perception is a classic topic in experimental psychology (see Boring, 1942).
The nature of the temporal intervals that are to be judged is one of the most studied
variables (Hicks, Miller, & Kinsboure, 1976). Temporal interval refers to a duration that
marks the beginning and end of an event or a duration between two distinct events.
Psychologists have long distinguished the difference between the duration of an
experience that occurs between encoding and retrieval. For example, James (1890/1950)
wrote, “In general, a time filled with varied and interesting experiences seems short in
passing, but long as we look back. On the other hand, a tract of time empty of
experiences seems long in passing but in retrospect short” (p. 624). These expressions
reveal that time perception is influenced by stimuli’s nontemporal features and the way
in which people are asked to judge time (for a review, see Grondin, 2010). When
participants are asked to estimate filled and unfilled intervals later in a recall manner, the
perceived duration of intervals filled with more events is generally longer than the
unfilled ones (Goldstone & Goldfarb, 1963). It is essential to recognize that the
distinction between filled and unfilled time shows an opposite pattern for duration
retrieval and encoding. In the experience paradigm, individuals encode filled intervals to
be shorter than unfilled intervals.
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The gap between duration encoding (experience) and retrieval has been
explained from two aspects. The first is an attentional resource explanation, according to
which greater allocation of attentional resources to process non-temporal aspects of the
stimulus reduces the attentional allocation to an internal cognitive timer, making the
experience of duration seem shorter (Zakay, 1989). The second emphasizes the role of
changes as a determinant of duration retrieval such that the greater the change (i.e., the
number of successive events that take place during a time interval), the greater the
perceived duration of the interval (based on the simple heuristic that it must take longer
for more things to happen; Fraisse,1984). For example, auditory stimuli that “move” at
higher levels of perceived activity (e.g., at a fast tempo) are perceived as longer in
duration (Zakay, 1989).
With regard to the retrieval of temporal intervals, another distinction was also
captured in the laboratory by using prospective and retrospective judgments (for a
review, see Block & Zakay, 1997). With the prospective judgment, participants are
instructed beforehand that they will have to estimate a target duration from memory.
This procedure presumably motivates participants to monitor the time going by and to
attend to any available temporal cues. In a retrospective paradigm, participants are asked
to estimate the duration of an experience but are not aware during the experience that
they will be asked to do so. Thus, participants engage in an activity throughout the target
duration without explicitly attending to information related to estimating the duration of
the experience. Later, they are asked to judge the duration based on their memory of the
experience. In this way, information related to duration is incidentally encoded during
the target duration and used at some later time to make an estimate. Although both
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prospective and retrospective duration judgments tend to be underestimated, the overall
prospective duration judgments are typically longer and more accurate than retrospective
judgments (Block & Zakay, 1997).
Discussion of factors that influence prospective and retrospective judgments can
be traced back to William James (1890/1950). He thought that attention “to the passage
of time itself” influences psychological duration in passing, whereas memory influences
psychological duration in retrospect. Contemporary researchers extended the
dissimilarity discussion between those two type of judgments. Hicks et al. (1976)
suggested that time judgments in a retrospective paradigm are proportional to the
amount of content retrieved from an interval, rather than to the amount of processing
performed during it. In contrast, the prospective judgment was explained by attentional
models for which judged duration is a direct function of the attention allocated to the
passage of time (e.g., Hicks, Miller, Gaes, & Bierman, 1977). Furthermore, Zakay
(1989) proposed a resource allocation model based on the concept of attentional
resources (Kahneman, 1973). With prospective instructions, more resources are
allocated to the temporal estimation than to nontemporal information processing. The
more resources allocated to temporal estimation, the longer the estimated duration.
Otherwise, the estimated duration will be reduced. In the retrospective paradigm,
because priority is given to nontemporal information, more resources are assigned to
nontemporal information processing. The more resources allocated to nontemporal
information, the longer the retrospective duration estimation will be since the duration
estimation relies on the nontemporal information.
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Zakay and Block (2004) asked participants to judge temporal intervals involved
with high-level, executive-control functions (e.g., switching between a color-word task
in which participants name the color in which the word appears and a word-color task in
which participants name the word) either prospectively or retrospectively. The operation
of high-level executive functions produced contextual changes that were encoded in
memory, which shortened the prospective estimation but resulted in longer retrospective
estimation. Therefore, Zakay and Block suggested that different cognitive processes
underlie prospective and retrospective timing.
Since the perceived duration of unfilled intervals is longer during experience than
during recall, the delayed rewards decision made from experience will reveal an overall
preference for larger/later rewards. Consequently, a gap is expected between delayed
decisions from description and from experience. Furthermore, for decisions made from
experience, the description and experience gap will be less evident for the decisions
made with a prospective judgment than with a retrospective judgment.
Action Effects
Distal Action Effect
With the rise of cognitive psychology, action selection has been conceived of and
studied with the human information-processing approach, the central tenet of which is
that a human can be characterized as a communication system (Proctor & Vu, 2012). In
the most basic form, human cognition can be described in terms of three general stages:
perception, cognition, and action (Proctor & Van Zandt, 2008; Proctor & Vu, 2006), and
action selection typically refers to processes that take place between the occurrence of an
action-triggering stimulus event and execution of the triggered action.
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With a different emphasis, the ideomotor approach (Greenwald, 1970; James,
1890/1950; Lotze, 1886) defines action or voluntary action as goal-directed movement
with a focus on the role of anticipation of sensory consequences in action selection.
Thus, a generative role is attributed to the sensory action effects: The anticipation is
what selects the corresponding actions suited to produce the actual effects. The most
comprehensive ideomotor approach to date is a general framework called the Theory of
Event Coding (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001). This framework
integrates a few main assumptions, including: 1) perception and action rely on shared
cognitive representations (i.e., an event file); 2) cognitive representations are composites
of feature codes; 3) cognitive representations refer to distal but not proximal aspects of
the represented events.
Regarding action-effect relations, ideomotor theory holds implicitly that the
association is bidirectional (Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). During the acquisition
phase or passive reaction scenarios, the activation of action always precedes the
activation of effect, whereas during intentional action production cases, the sensory
effect must be activated first to activate the action. Most studies on action-effect learning
have used an induction paradigm to investigate the acquisition of bidirectional actioneffect associations (Elsner & Hommel, 2001; also see response-effect compatibility,
Kunde, 2001). This paradigm typically consists of an acquisition phase followed by a
test phase. The acquisition phase is used to establish arbitrary action-effect associations:
Participants repeatedly perform two or more actions such as pressing a left or right
response key. Each response produces a distinct sensory effect, such as a high- or a lowpitch tone. In the subsequent test phase, the former action effects (i.e., tones) are
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presented as stimuli, and participants respond to them. Reaction time (RT) in the
condition with a consistent action-effect mapping of the preceding acquisition phase is
shorter relative to the condition that is inconsistent with previous learning episode,
indicating an automatic activation of action-effect association that may concur or
conflict with the instructed responses.
Despite the interests in action-effect learning, a limiting characteristic of those
studies is that the action effect occurred immediately following the response. Few
studies have examined the role of longer intervals between actions and effects on the
anticipation of goals for action selection (Dignath, Pfister, Eder, Kiesel, & Kunde, 2014;
Janczyk, Durst, & Ulrich, 2017; Wirth, Pfister, Jancyzk, & Kunde, 2015). Those studies
revealed that temporal information about the interval between actions and their
consequent effects was integrated into a cognitive action structure and automatically
retrieved during response selection.
But the retrieval of a long action-effect interval slows down response selection.
For example, Dignath et al. (2014) examined whether the temporal interval between an
action and its sensory effect is integrated into the cognitive action structure in a
bidirectional fashion. In their study, participants first experienced specific action effects
that occurred temporally delayed after their actions. Specifically, participants responded
to a red or green asterisk with a left or right button press, and a high- or low-pitch tone
was presented after a 2-s delay upon registration of the button press. In a following test
phase, the high- or low-pitch tone was presented as a prime for responses that had
caused them and the interval that previously separated action and effects. In a go/no-go
task, a larger proportion of choices consistent with the initial action-effect learning
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(effect-consistent) was selected by participants, and participants needed more time to
initiate effect-consistent responses than responses that were inconsistent with previous
experience (effect-inconsistent). When a forced-choice task was implemented, a longer
RT was also evident for the effect-consistent responses. When response-contingent
effects were presented with a long- or short-delay after a response, RT in both forcedchoice and free-choice tests was faster in the short- than long-interval condition.
Altogether, these findings provide evidence that temporal information about the interval
between action and effect is integrated into a cognitive action representation and can be
automatically retrieved during response selection (also see Wirth et al., 2015).
Along the same lines, Janczyk et al. (2017) investigated whether temporally more
distal action effects are also anticipated during action selection. A spatial response-effect
compatibility paradigm was used, in which participants responded to a center-presented
stimulus with a left or right keypress. When a response was given, one of two white
outlines was filled in with white color and the location of its initial onset was visualized
by white outlines to the left or right of the screen center (i.e., immediately following the
response, E1). After the circle filled white for 500 ms, it jumped to the left or to the right
of its current location as another visual effect (E2). Thus, the first-occurring action effect
changed its position after some time in either a response-compatible or a responseincompatible direction. With both forced-choice and free-choice trials, RTs were not
much affected by response-E1 compatibility but RTs were shorter for response-E2
compatible trials than the incompatible trials. The findings revealed that response-effect
compatibility was only observed for the temporally more distal effect (E2) and the
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compatibility of the immediate action effect (E1) did not play a role. This suggests that
temporally more distal effects can be anticipated during action selection.
The results of those studies point in the same direction that action effects do not
have to occur immediately following a response in order to affect action selection.
However, it is not clear whether the temporal interval between the action and its
associated effect is considered a single feature or is integrated with other effects. Thus,
investigating the action effects together with the delayed choice, to see how they interact
with each other, will be informative.
Affective Action Effect
Action selection is relatively simple when the available effects differ on only one
dimension: Individuals tend to execute spatially compatible rather than incompatible
options, and to select actions sooner rather later. However, action selection becomes
substantially more difficult when action-effect alternatives differ on more than one
dimension. For example, when an individual must choose between a smaller reward
available sooner and a larger reward available later, it is unclear which alternative an
individual would select and how individuals make trade-offs between the two
alternatives.
Hommel, Lippelt, Gurbuz, and Pfister (2017) combined sensory and affective
action effects to investigate the impact of anticipated action effects and their interaction
during action selection and following movement trajectories. Using a game-like
experiment setting, they had participants move an avatar to a portal on the left or right
side of a screen in order to collect a cake (actual goal) of high or low value. The cakes
could not be accessed directly but rather through a portal on the same or opposite side.
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The location of the cake was either spatially compatible or incompatible with the action
(i.e., the location to which the avatar was to move), allowing investigation of the impact
of sensory action-effect compatibility. The targeted cake was either low or high in value,
allowing for the manipulation of affective action effect since the higher-valued cake
(which should induce more approach motivation) was either spatially compatible or
incompatible with the action. The authors also contrasted forced-choice and free-choice
tasks, and they found no indication of direct interaction between sensory and affective
action-effect compatibility, suggesting that sensory and affective action effects influence
action control in an additive manner.
This suggestion of independent mechanisms for sensory and affective effects
applies mainly to settings in which the sensory effect is in the spatial dimension (also see
Wirth, Pfister, & Kunde, 2016). Temporal information about the interval between
actions and sensory effects was shown to be integrated into a cognitive action structure
and automatically retrieved during response selection. But little is known about how
people can acquire a delayed action-effect association when affective status varies, and
how these learned conflicts are used during action selection.
Present Study
The present study investigated description- and experience-based reward
selection with delays in the seconds time-level. A description-experience gap of delayed
choice in seconds time-level was hypothesized to occur due to poor estimation of the
differences between temporal delays when decisions are made from experience. Thus,
measures that promote more precise estimation of the temporal interval during
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experience, such as inclusion of prospective temporal interval judgments and acoustic
action effects, were intended to mitigate the description-experience gap.
The first two experiments were aimed at making the case that the temporal
discounting function in the description paradigm is evident at the seconds time-level. If
the temporal discounting is evident, then the discounting functions across different time
ranges are similar, indicating a consistent nonlinear representation of time from
description regardless of scale. The remaining experiments were designed to evaluate the
description-experience gap of delayed reward selections. Across experiments, different
factors that may impact the gap were investigated. Each experiment included two
sections, each of which used only one pair of temporal delays. Within each section, the
description block was the same as the paradigm used for prior experiments. There were
two experience blocks in each section, with a factor of interest implemented.
Experiments 3 and 4 evaluated the influence of retrospective and prospective
duration judgments on delayed decision-making in the experience paradigm. Rewards
after unfilled temporal delays were presented as the effects of action selections. Before
experiencing a delayed reward presented as action-selection feedback, participants first
learned the associations of rewards and actions. After each experience block in each
section, participants were asked to recall the amount and delay of each reward in
decisions from experience. In Experiment 3, participants were not informed about this
memory test beforehand, which rendered the judgments in the first experience blocks
retrospective but the judgments in the second blocks prospective. In Experiment 4,
participants were informed of the memory test in advance, so the time judgments in both
experience blocks were prospective. Experiment 5 examined the influence of an acoustic
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action effect with an action-effect learning paradigm. After two experience blocks in
each section, participants were asked to recall the amount and delay of each reward in
decisions from experience. Because participants were not informed about this judgment
beforehand, the judgment in the first section was retrospective, whereas the judgment in
the second section was implicitly prospective. In the following, I describe each
experiment and the results in detail.
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EXPERIMENT 1. DELAYED REWARDS SELECTION FROM
DESCRIPTION AT SECONDS TIME-LEVEL

This experiment was designed to examine the temporal discounting in the
seconds time-level, which is a fairly small scale if compared to daily, weekly, monthly,
or yearly delays in typical discounting function studies (Green & Myerson, 2004). Due
to my main interest being in the description-experience gap, the pair of rewards used was
same as that of Hertwig, et al. (2004), that is, $4 and $3. Participants chose between
pairs of described hypothetical rewards with different delays in three blocks.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four students (8 male; Mage = 19.3 years) participated. All participants
received research credits for an Introductory Psychology course at Purdue University
and informed consent was obtained for each participant. They reported having normal or
corrected to normal vision and hearing, and were naïve to the purpose of the study. The
sample size of 24 participants was based on the subject number used in Green et al.
(1994), which should yield an adequate power larger than 0.8 for a similar effect size
based on a power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
Procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board of Purdue University.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Stimulus presentation and response recording were achieved by means of EPrime 2.0 software installed on a PC workstation. Participants were seated in front of a
76-cm high table on which an E-Prime response box with a row of five response buttons
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was placed. Instructions, visual stimuli, and response feedback were presented on a 19inch LCD monitor in front of participants, with an unconstrained viewing distance of
approximately 50 cm. The response box was center-aligned with the display. One pair of
rewards was used: $4 and $3. Each reward was available sooner or later in three blocks:
Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s , or 8 s vs. 10 s, respectively.
Design and Procedure
Within each block, there were four possible reward options, a smaller/sooner
reward (e.g., $3 Now), a larger/later reward (e.g., $4 in 2 s), a smaller/later reward
(e.g., $3 in 2 s), and a larger/sooner reward (e.g., $4 Now). Each block consisted of 56
trials and included a mixture of trial types: 40 decision trials that required a decision
between larger/later and smaller/sooner rewards, and 16 catch trials that required a
decision between the same amount of rewards but differed only in receiving time (e.g.,
$3 Now vs. $3 in 2 s). The catch trials were designed to ensure that participants were
engaged in the task (Gibson, 1941) since it is rational to choose the same amount of
reward available sooner rather than later.
At the beginning of the task, participants were told to sit with the body midline
aligned with the center of the screen and place their index fingers on top of the very left
and right buttons of the response box. They were asked to maintain that posture during
the whole experiment. Then the following instructions were presented and verbalized by
the experimenters to each participant:
The purpose of this study is to examine your preference for different
hypothetical rewards. The study includes three blocks and you will have a
short break in between. Each trial starts with a black star, then two
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hypothetical rewards varied in amount and receiving time will be
presented on the left and right on the screen. You are to choose your
preferred reward by pressing the corresponding left or right button. In
making your selections, it is important to read carefully the information
presented on the screen because it specifies when the reward will be made
available. Your total selection results will be presented in the end of each
block.
Participants started the trials after they were clear about the procedure. On each
trial, a black star (10 mm × 10 mm) was centrally presented on a white screen for 500
ms, then a pair of hypothetical rewards with the amounts in dollars and when they could
be received were presented to the left center and right center of the screen until a buttonpress response was made. For example, participants would see the following choices:

$3

$4

Now

in 2 seconds

After a choice selection with the corresponding button, the options disappeared,
but no feedback or action effect was given. An intertrial interval of 1,500 ms began
immediately after a response. If no response was detected within 5,000 ms of stimulus
onset, a visual error message (“Please respond faster!”) was presented for 1,000 ms (a
total of 6 such errors was obtained, mainly occurring in a few beginning trials of the first
block). At the end of each block, the total amounts of sooner and later rewards that the
participant selected were presented. The presentation order of the three blocks was
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counterbalanced between participants, and within each block the trial order was
randomized. Each decision option appeared equally on either side of the screen.
Participants were tested individually in enclosed rooms. The experimenter stayed in the
dimly lit room for the whole experiment and repeated the same instructions for each of
the remaining blocks.
Results
Performance of less than 60% selection of the shorter delay on catch trials was
used as an exclusion criterion for this and the rest of the experiments, following
established protocol from prior experiments (Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). No participants
were excluded.
Choice Data
Decision trials. Figure 2 plots the proportion of larger/later reward selection in
each temporal delay block. When the rewards pair of $3 Now and $4 in 2 seconds were
presented, participants preferred the larger/later reward over the smaller/sooner reward.
This preference disappeared when an equivalent 2-s delay was added to each reward, but
reappeared when an additional 6-s delay was added for each reward.
A repeated-measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the ratios
of the rewards selection with 2 (reward type: larger/later, smaller/sooner) × 3 (delay
block: Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) as within-subject factors. There was a main
effect of reward type, F(1,23) = 16.25, p = .001, ηp2 = .414. Participants chose more
larger/later rewards (73.8%) than smaller/sooner rewards (26.1%). The interaction of
reward type × delay block was also significant, F(2,46) = 8.22, p = .001, ηp2 = .263,
showing the preference of larger/later rewards was varied between blocks (83.8% for
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Now vs. 2 s block; 53.4% for 2 s vs. 4 s block; 84.1% for 8 s vs. 10 s block). Comparison
between each delay-block pair revealed a difference between Now vs. 2 s and 2 s vs. 4 s
(p = .003) and between 2 s vs. 4 s and 8 s vs. 10 s (p = .004), but not between Now vs. 2 s
and 8 s vs. 10 s (p = .978).
Catch trials. Selection of later rewards were errors for catch trials. Figure 3
depicts the error selection ratios of both error types (larger/later, smaller/later).
ANOVA was conducted on the ratios of error selection with 2 (error type: larger/later,
smaller/later) × 3 (delay block: Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) as within-subject
factors. The average error rates of catch trials for each delay block were 3.6% (Now vs. 2
s), 6.0% (2 s vs. 4 s), and 7.3% (8 s vs. 10 s). Average error rates showed no significant
differences among delay blocks, F(2, 46) = 1.31, p = .275, ηp2 = .054, indicating that
participants’ engagement in different blocks was similar. The 2-way interaction of error
type × delay block was significant, F(2, 46) = 9.91, p = .001, ηp2 = .301, mainly due to
more selection of the larger/later errors in the 8 s vs. 10 s block but not the others.
Decision Time
The mean time to complete the selection of decision trials and catch trials was
depicted in Figure 4. For catch trials, only the results of correct choice selection were
included for analysis. ANOVA was conducted on the decision time with 3 (delay block:
(Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) × 2 (trial type: decision trials, catch trials) as
within-subject variables. There was a main effect of delay block, F(2, 46) = 12.70, p <
.001, ηp2 = .356: Decision time increased when delay increased (M = 1048 ms for Now
vs. 2 s block; M = 1215 ms for 2 s vs. 4 s block; M = 1315 ms for 8 s vs. 10 s block; ps <
.001 for pairwise comparisons). The main effect of trial type was also significant, F(1, 23)
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= 32.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .587. Decision time of the catch trials (M = 1269 ms) was longer
than the decision trials (M = 1117 ms), probably because the catch trials were less
frequent than the decision trials. The interaction between these two variables was not
significant, F(2, 46) = 2.42, p = .116, ηp2 = .095.
Discussion
First of all, the current experiment showed a reward preference difference
between temporal delays, confirming a delay discounting when reward temporal delays
are described in the seconds time-level. Specifically, there was a preference for the
larger/later reward in the 8 s vs. 10 s block but not in the 2 s vs. 4 s block, consistent
with the temporal discounting obtained in larger time scales (Green & Myerson, 2004).
However, when there was no delay for the small reward in the Now vs. 2 s block,
a preference for the smaller/sooner reward was not evident. Instead, there was a
preference for the larger/later reward, which is similar to the results of the 8 s vs. 10 s
block. One possible reason for this discrepancy from previous results is the seconds
time-level used in this experiment. In the prior temporal discounting literature, Now was
typically compared to delays in larger time scales, such as days, months, or years (e.g.,
Green et al., 1994). Although the rewards were larger, it took quite a long time to get
them (e.g., $200 in 1 year). Therefore, receiving a reward immediately was preferred
(e.g., $100 Now). In the current experiment, most participants preferred the larger/later
reward ($4 in 2 s) rather than the smaller/sooner one ($3 Now), probably because it only
took an extra 2 s to get the larger reward.
Nevertheless, participants did not show a preference for the larger/later reward
in the 2 s vs. 4 s block, indicating that the discrepancy seems not to be simply a matter of
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waiting an extra 2 s. In the 2 s vs. 4 s block, the extra 2 s is relative to a basis of 2 s,
making the subjective value of 2 s relatively large. However, in the Now vs. 2 s block,
the extra 2 s waiting time is compared to Now, indicating an absolute 2 s. Without any
reference, 2 s is typically perceived as being short. In the 8 s vs. 10 s block, the extra 2 s
is compared on a basis of 8 s, which makes the subjective value of 2 s relatively small.
Therefore, that participants selected the larger/later reward more often in the Now vs. 2 s
block may be due to an absolute but not relative delay comparison in the seconds timelevel.
Longer decision times were obtained for the longer temporal delays than for the
shorter ones. That is, the choice selection took more time when longer delays were
associated with the choice. The results imply that participants took the expected
temporal delay into consideration during the choice selection. Without actual temporal
interval discrimination, longer decision time obtained for longer delays seems to have
root in the number representation of the delays. Previous studies revealed a non-linear
mental number line representation (Dehaene, 2003). And the perceived difference
between numbers with same gap (e.g., 2 and 4 vs. 8 and 10) is less when the magnitude
of the numbers is larger. In other words, the perceived difference between 2 and 4 is
larger than 8 and 10. Therefore, when the rewards’ receiving times were delayed (e.g.,
from 2 s vs. 4 to 8 s vs. 10 s), the difficulty of time (number) discrimination may have
made people become more reliant on the reward amount when they made decisions,
introducing the temporal discounting. The neglect of the temporal dimension in the 8 s
vs. 10 s block was also suggested by the higher larger/later error rate in the catch trials.
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EXPERIMENT 2. DELAYED REWARDS WITH LARGE AMOUNTS

Prior research examined the effect of reward amount on the temporal discounting
rate and the results showed that smaller delayed rewards are discounted more steeply
than larger delayed rewards (Green, Myerson, & Ostaszewski, 1999). The current
experiment was designed to evaluate whether the preference pattern obtained in
Experiment 1 is still evident when larger amounts of reward are paired with delays in the
seconds time-level. The rewards used were $20 and $15, which were 5-times the
amounts used in Experiment 1 and in a similar range as those of $50 and $20 used by
Green et al. (1994). A similar preference pattern was expected as in Experiment 1, but
with a shallow discounting. Longer decision times were also expected for the longerdelay blocks because the perceived time-difference reduction should be independent
from the increased reward amounts.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four new students (14 male; Mage = 19.9 years) were recruited from the
same subject pool as Experiment 1 and informed consent was obtained for each
participant. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and were naïve to
the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli, Apparatus, and Procedure
All stimuli, apparatus, and procedure were the same as Experiment 1, except that
the reward amounts were $20 and $15.
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Results
All participants were included in the following analysis. The average error rate of
catch trials was 9.4%. Results were analyzed in a similar way as Experiment 1.
Choice Data
Decision trials. Figure 5 depicts the proportion of larger/later reward selection
in each block. With the larger reward amounts implemented in this experiment,
participants showed a preference to larger/later reward in all blocks but the preference
tended to be larger for the 8 s vs. 10 s block than the others. ANOVA was conducted in
the same way as Experiment 1 and results showed a similar pattern. There was a
preference for larger/later reward (73.8%), F(1,23) = 14.52, p = .001, ηp2 = .387, and the
preference varied between blocks (70.2% for Now vs. 2 s block; 65.1% for 2 s vs. 4 s
block; 86% for 8 s vs. 10 s block), F(2,46) = 3.74, p = .041, ηp2 = .140. Comparison
between each delay-block pair revealed a significant preference difference between 2 s
vs. 4 s and 8 s vs. 10 s (p = .032), a less evident preference difference between Now vs. 2
s and 8 s vs. 10 s (p = .075), but no difference between Now vs. 2 s and 2 s vs. 4 s (p =
.403).
Catch trials. Figure 6 illustrates the proportion of error selection for catch trials.
The average error rates of catch trials for each block were 9.1% (Now vs. 2 s), 5.7% (2 s
vs. 4 s), and 13.3% (8 s vs. 10 s). Only the main effect of delay approached significance,
F(2,46) = 3.23, p = .069, ηp2 = .123. Pairwise comparisons showed that the error-rate
differences between 8 s vs. 10 s and 2 s vs. 4 s blocks were at the .05 significance level,
p = .053.
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Decision Time
Figure 7 presents the mean decision times. ANOVA showed a similar pattern as
Experiment 1. There was a main effect for delay block, F(2, 46) = 9.91, p < .001, ηp2 =
.301. Decision time increased when the temporal delays were increased (M = 995 ms for
Now vs. 2 s block; M = 1090 ms for 2 s vs. 4 s block; M = 1221 ms for 8 s vs. 10 s
block; ps < .001 for pairwise comparisons), again, implying the difficulty to discriminate
the 2-s gap when time was delayed. The main effect of trial type (M = 1057 ms for
decision trials; M = 1147 ms for catch trials) was also significant, F(1, 23) = 48.71, p <
.001, ηp2 = .679. As in Experiment 1, participants took more time to select the correct
catch trials than the decision trials. The interaction between these two variables was not
significant, F < 1.0.
Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2
To inspect the influence of reward amount in the seconds time-level, ANOVA
was conducted in the same way as Experiments 1 and 2 but with reward amount as an
additional between-subject factor. There was a main effect of reward type, F(1,46) =
30.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .400, revealing an overall preference for larger/later rewards. The
interaction of reward type × delay block was also significant, F(2,92) = 9.97, p < .001, ηp2
= .178. Participants selected less larger/later rewards in the 2 s vs. 4 s blocks (59.3%)
than in the Now vs. 2 s blocks (77%) and the 8 s vs. 10 s blocks (85.1%). But the 3-way
interaction of reward type × delay block × reward amount was not significant, F(2,92) =
2.34, p = .105, ηp2 = .048, indicating the preference pattern for the larger/later rewards
among the three delay blocks was similar between two experiments.
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ANOVA for decision times had three factors, 3 (delay block: Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs.
4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) × 2 (trial type: decision trials, catch trials) × 2 (reward amount: $4 and
$3, $20 and $15), with the first two factors being within-subjects and the third being
between-subjects. Across the two experiments, reward amount did not show significant
influence on decision time, F(1, 46) = 1.02, p = .317, ηp2 = .022. But the 2-way interaction
of reward amount × trial type was significant, F(1, 46) = 4.37, p = .042, ηp2 = .087. When
reward amounts were increased in Experiment 2, decision time for the decision trials
was reduced in a smaller manner (60 ms) compared to the reduction of catch trials (120
ms). The 3-way interaction of delay block × trial type × reward amount approached the
.05 criterion, F(2, 92) = 2.76, p = .076, ηp2 = .057, mainly due to a larger reduction of
decision time for catch trials in the 2 s vs. 4 s block than in the other two blocks (see
Figures 4 and 7).
ANOVA for catch trial errors were analyzed in a similar way as decision time
except that the second within-subjects factor was error type. For catch trial errors, only
the main effect of reward amount approached the .05 criterion, F(1, 46) = 3.33, p = .075,
ηp2 = .067. Error rates tended to be larger for the larger amount rewards (9.4%) than for
the smaller amount rewards (5.6%). Faster responses but with more errors suggests that
participants relied more on an ineffective cue (e.g., reward amount) for their decisions
on catch trials in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
Discussion
When larger reward amounts were implemented, the proportion of a larger/later
reward selection was increased when equivalent delays in the seconds time-level were
added for both rewards, indicating a temporal discounting. Although the effect of
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amount was not statistically different, the degree of discounting for the larger amount
tended to be shallow, which was in the same direction as typically obtained (Green &
Myerson, 2004). For the temporal discounting, the lack of a quantitative difference
between Experiments 1 and 2 is likely due to the relative difference between $4 and $3
and $20 and $15 being smaller than the pairs typically used in previous work to evaluate
the effect of reward amount (e.g., $25 and $50 and $1000 and $2000; Du, Green, &
Myerson, 2002; Green et al., 1999).
The reward preference showed no difference between the Now vs. 2 s and 2 s vs.
4 s blocks delay, which was different from the results of Experiment 1. One possible
reason for the gap is that when larger reward amounts were implemented in the seconds
time-level, participants relied more on the reward amounts to make the decisions, which
was suggested by the shorter decision times and larger error rates of catch trials.
With the larger reward amounts used in Experiment 2, decision time for catch
trials in the 2 s vs. 4 s block tended to be reduced more than the other two blocks, which
may be due to the different amount- and delay-magnitudes used in Experiment 2. The
reward amounts and delays were both represented in the number format. Thus, when the
magnitude of each dimension was in different ranges, minimal interference was
expected, which reduced the decision time of catch trials. In contrast, when a similar
magnitude range was used for both dimensions in Experiment 1, interference was
introduced when selecting a choice on catch trials, increased the decision time.
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 both confirmed the temporal discounting in
the seconds time-level, providing a basis to evaluate the description-experience gap of
delayed rewards selection. Because the temporal discounting of $4 and $3 rewards pair
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tended to be steep between the 2 s vs. 4 s and 8 s vs. 10 s, those rewards and temporal
delays were used to investigate the description and experience gap in the following
experiments.
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EXPERIMENT 3. DELAYED REWARD SELECTION FROM
DESCRIPTION VS. EXPERIENCE

The aim of Experiment 3 was to examine the description-experience gap of
delayed rewards selection. To measure the gap, a design was used that tested decisions
from description and decisions from experience in the same subjects, where two delay
blocks, 2 s vs. 4 s and 8 s vs. 10 s were implemented in two separate sections. Within
each section, participants selected their preferred rewards in one description and two
experience blocks. The description block used the same paradigm as the prior
experiments. A partial-feedback procedure was employed for the decisions from
experience, in which participants received feedback (i.e., an affective action effect) after
each choice for the selected option (Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron, 2005). A
memory test was conducted to evaluate participants’ ability to access information about
the delayed outcome in decisions from experience, as well as their ability to estimate the
temporal delay after which each outcome occurred. Because participants were not
informed about the test beforehand, the judgment in the first experience block of each
section was retrospective. In the second experience block of each section, participants
were explicitly told that they would receive a memory test afterwards.
I hypothesized that the perception of temporal delay might be one way in which
decisions from description and experience differ from each other. Specifically, I
predicted that similar results as Experiment 1 would be obtained for the description
blocks between the two delay blocks, showing a temporal discounting. For the first
experience block of each delay section, the experienced temporal delays were expected
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to be generally longer, which would make the reward selection in the 2 s vs. 4 s section
closer to that of the 8 s vs.10 s section. However, if the temporal intervals and the reward
presentations were considered to be integrated with each other, the presentations of the
rewards would promote a more precise estimation of the temporal duration like that
obtained in action effect paradigm (Dignath et al., 2014; Janczyk et al., 2017). Thus, a
similar preference difference as decisions from description would be expected. Because
participants were explicitly instructed to estimate temporal delays in the second
experience block of each section, a more accurate estimation of temporal delays was
expected, which would make the delayed rewards selection close to the decisions from
description.
Method
Participants
A total of 32 participants (11 male; Mage= 19.0 years) were drawn from the same
subject pool as prior experiments, and informed consent was obtained for each
participant. Two additional participants were excluded due to error rates of catch trials in
the description blocks being larger than 60%. Participants received course credits for
participating.
The sample size was based on a power analysis conducted with G*Power 3.1
using the risky choice results of Hertwig et al. (2004). Their results were used because
(1) there was no prior study in the literature that evaluated the description-experience
gap for the delayed rewards directly; (2) the temporal discounting and probability
discounting functions can be explained by one hyperboloid function (Green & Myerson,
2004) and similar processes have been proposed to underly both types of discounting
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(Vanderveldt et al., 2017). Specifically, an effect size was estimated based on the
description and experience results (0.36 vs. 0.88) from Hertwig et al.’s (2004) Decision
problem 1. The calculated effect size (0.76) for the description-experience gap was input
to estimate that this number of participants would yield an adequate power larger than
0.8.
Apparatus and Stimuli
All stimuli and apparatus in the description blocks were the same as prior
experiments except as noted. Each reward ($4 and $3) was available sooner or later with
two pairs of temporal delays, 2 s vs. 4 s and 8 s vs. 10 s, separately. For the experience
blocks, participants made binary decisions between pairs of color stars (10 mm × 10 mm
each), which were selected from four possible colored stars (green, red, cyan, and
magenta). Green and red colored stars were used for decision trials, which led to a
larger/later or a smaller/sooner reward. Cyan and magenta colored stars were used in
catch trials, which led to a larger/sooner or a smaller/later reward. Participants could
only learn about the delays and outcomes by selecting the star. After a choice selection,
the star/stars disappeared, and the outcome (e.g., $3) appeared as an affective action
effect after the associated delay (e.g., 2 s).
Design and Procedure
The experiment included two sections, in each of which only one pair of
temporal delays (2 s vs. 4 s or 8 s vs. 10 s) was used. In each section there were three
blocks which included one block of decisions from description and two blocks of
decisions from experience. For each section, only one block of decisions from
description was included because prior research indicated that decisions from description
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remain relatively stable across blocks (e.g., Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2014). Prior to
the first experience block of each section, participants were presented with single-star
trials to provide experience with the experimental procedure.
At the beginning of the task, participants were told to sit with the body midline
aligned with the center of the screen, and place their index fingers on top of the very left
and right buttons on the response box. They were asked to maintain that posture during
the whole experiment.
Decisions from description. At the start of the description block, the
experimenter read the same instructions as Experiment 1 to participants. The procedure
was the same as Experiment 1 except only two delay blocks (2 s vs. 4 s and 8 s vs. 10 s)
were included in two separate sections.
Decisions from experience. At the start of each experience block, the
experimenter gave the following instructions to each participant:
You are to choose the colored star that leads to your preferred hypothetical
reward in this task. Each trial starts with a black star, then two colored
stars are presented on the left and right on the screen. Each color star leads
to a hypothetical reward that is the same to what you experienced in the
prior single colored star trials. You are to choose the colored star leading
to your preferred reward by pressing the corresponding left or right button.
After each response, the hypothetical reward varied in amount and
receiving time will be presented. Your total selection results will be
presented in the end.
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Participants started the trials after they were clear about the procedure. On each
trial, the same black star as in the description block was centrally presented on a white
screen for 500 ms. Then a pair of colored stars of same size as the black star were
presented to the left center and right center of the screen until a button-press response
was to be made. After a choice selection, the options disappeared and the associated
reward of the selected colored star was presented as an action effect for 1,000 ms after
the corresponding temporal delay. Feedback only consisted the reward amount (e.g., $3).
If no response was detected within 5,000 ms of stimulus onset, visual error message
(“Please respond faster!”) were presented for 1,000 ms (a total 7 trials were obtained for
such error). At the end of each block, the total amount of sooner and later rewards that
participants selected were presented.
Each pair of colored stars was selected from four colors: red, green, cyan, and
magenta. Each color star always led to a reward that corresponded to one of the rewards
described in the description block. Assignment of color stars to particular rewards was
counterbalanced between participants. Participants learned about the temporal delays
and reward amounts by selecting the stars. Each experience block was composed of 64
trials and included a mixture of trial types: There were 40 decision trials, which required
a choice between larger/later or smaller/sooner rewards (20 of each). There were 16
catch trials, which required a choice between sooner or later rewards with same
outcomes. There were also 8 single colored trials, which only included one colored star
and had to be selected to continue. These trials were implemented to make all reward
contingencies were experienced even if the colored star were not selected at all in the
pairwise manner, limiting any hot stove effects (people overweight the worst of two
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outcomes during experience and are unwilling to change the bias for the worst outcome
even if that outcome becomes the best choice in another situation; Denrell & March,
2001).
Prior to the first experience blocks, participants performed 32 single colored star
trials (8 in each color) in a forced-choice manner to experience the experimental
procedure. Each trial was the same as those in the experience blocks except: 1) Only one
colored star was centrally presented; 2) Participants were instructed to press one of two
response buttons (left or right) based on the color of the star as fast and as accurately as
possible. The assignment of left and right button presses to the colored star and the
association of colored stars to particular rewards were counterbalanced across
participants. The instructions that participants received are as follows:
At the beginning of each trial, a black star will appear on the screen. If the
star changes to red (or cyan), press the left [right] button as soon as
possible. If the star changes to green (or magenta), press the right [left]
button as soon as possible. Each time you press a button, a hypothetical
reward varied in amount and receiving time will also be presented. Try to
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
After completing the three blocks with one pair of temporal delays, participants
took a self-paced short break and then finished the second section with the other pair of
temporal delays. Within each block, trial order was randomized. Each colored star
appeared equally often on either side of the screen. Also, the presentation order of the
description and experience blocks was counterbalanced between participants but kept
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consistent between the two sections within participants. Order of the two delay block (2
s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) was also counterbalanced between participants.
Participants were tested individually in enclosed rooms. The experimenter stayed
in the dimly lit room for the whole experiment and read the instructions of each block.
Memory tests. After the first experience block of each section, participants were
asked to recall the outcomes and delays that were associated with each colored star and
to write those down by themselves. Participants were not informed ahead that this test
would be required for the first experience block of each section but the test of the second
block in each section was informed ahead explicitly.
Results
The average error rate of catch trials in the description blocks was 14.8%. The
results were analyzed in the similar way as prior experiments. The memory test results of
the reward amounts and temporal delays were also reported.
Choice Data
ANOVA were performed to examine whether the ratio of the reward selection
varied between the two delay blocks, and whether such variation was independent of
decisions from description or experience. The choice selections of catch trials were also
analyzed in a similar manner.
Decision trials. Figure 8 depicts the proportion of the larger/later reward
selection for decision trials. ANOVA was conducted on the ratios of rewards selection
with 2 (reward type: larger/later, smaller/sooner) × 2 (delay block: 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10
s) × 3 (decision type: description, experience 1st, experience 2nd) as within-subject
factors. The main effect of reward type was not significant, F(1,31) = 1.82, p = .187, ηp2 =
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.055, indicating there was no preference for a specific reward in general. However, the
interaction of reward type × delay block was significant, F(1,31) = 5.03, p = .032, ηp2 =
.139. Participants selected more larger/later rewards in the 8 s vs. 10 s delay block
(62.7%) than in the 2 s vs. 4 s delay block (47.9%), showing a preference reversal.
Moreover, this preference reversal varied between decision types, F(2,62) = 5.68, p = .008,
ηp2 = .155, suggesting a description-experience gap.
Description and experience gap. To examine the description-experience gap of
decision trials, the results of the first and the second experience blocks were compared to
the results of the description blocks, respectively. The gap was evident between the
description [selection of larger/later rewards: 34.1% (2 s vs. 4 s), 69.3% (8 s vs. 10 s)]
and the 1st experience blocks [selection of larger/later rewards: 61.4% (2 s vs. 4 s),
71.6% (8 s vs. 10 s)], F(1,31) = 4.02, p = .054, ηp2 = .115, as well as the description and
the 2nd experience blocks [selection of larger/later rewards: 48.2% (2 s vs. 4 s), 47.3% (8
s vs. 10 s)] , F(1,31) = 10.26, p = .003, ηp2 = .249.
For the overall decisions made from experience (Figure 8 middle and right
columns), the main effect of reward type was not significant, F(1,31) = 1.31, p = .119, ηp2
= .077. Participants showed no preference for a specific reward. However, the 2-way
interaction of reward type × instruction (experience 1st: retrospective, experience 2nd:
prospective) was significant, F(1,31) = 20.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .392. Preference of the
larger/later reward was evident in the first blocks with retrospective instructions
(66.5%), but not the second blocks with prospective instructions (47.8%). When
participants were explicitly informed that they would be asked to recall the reward
amounts and delays, their preference for the larger/later rewards was reduced.
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Catch trials. Figure 9 plots the proportion of error selection in catch trials for the
description and experience blocks. ANOVA was conducted on the error selection results
with 2 (error type: larger/later, smaller/later) × 2 (delay block: 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s)
× 3 (decision type: description, experience 1st, experience 2nd) as within-subject
factors. When a pair of same-amount rewards that varied in receiving time were
represented by colored stars in the experience blocks, the overall error rate was increased
(description: 14.8%, experience 1st block: 39.7%, experience 2nd block: 30.4%), F(2,62) =
30.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .493. The 2-way interaction of error type × decision type was also
significant, F(2,62) = 6.82, p = .005, ηp2 = .180. There were more larger/later errors
(9.3%) than smaller/later errors (5.6%) in decisions from description but an opposite
pattern was evident in decisions from experience (larger/later: 14.4%, smaller/later:
20.8%). Across all blocks, the error rates for the two delay blocks were similar, and
temporal delay did not interact with decision type, Fs < 1.0.
Description and experience gap. For overall catch-trial errors, a descriptionexperience gap was evident between the description and the first experience blocks,
F(1,31) = 58.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .653, as well as the description and the second experience
blocks, F(1,31) = 19.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .391. With prospective instructions in the second
experience blocks, the error rate was reduced compared to the results of the first
experience blocks, F(1,31) = 10.03, p = .003, ηp2 = .244.
The description-experience gap for each error type (larger/later, smaller/later)
was also examined. Compared to the results of the description blocks, for larger/later
error, a gap was evident between the description and the first experience blocks, F(1,31) =
8.46, p = .007, ηp2 = .214, but not description and the second experience blocks, F < 1.0.
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The difference between the two experience blocks was also significant, F(1,31) = 17.96, p
< .001, ηp2 = .367, implying an influence of prospective instructions on the change.
For smaller/later error, compared to the description blocks, more errors were
evident in the first experience blocks, F(1,31) = 42.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .576, and the
second experience blocks, F(1,31) = 33.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .517. But there was no
difference between the two experience blocks (see Figure 9 center and right columns), F
< 1.0, suggesting that the increased smaller/later error was independent from the
prospective instructions.
Decision Time
Figure 10 presents the results of mean decision time. Decision times of decision
trials and catch trials were submitted to ANOVA with 2 (delay block: 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs.
10 s) × 3 (decision type: description, experience 1st block, experience 2nd block) as
within-subject factors. As in Experiments 1 and 2, participants took longer to select
catch trials (915 ms) than decision trials (767 ms), F(1, 31) = 81.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .725.
The main effect of delay block was also significant, F(1, 31) = 4.73, p = .037, ηp2 = .132.
Choice selection was faster (812 ms) for shorter delays than for longer delays (870 ms).
Decision times were longer for the description blocks (1151 ms) than for the experience
blocks (1st: 697 ms, 2nd: 676 ms), F(2, 62) = 34.80, p < .001, ηp2 = .529. No other term
showed significant or approached significance level, Fs < 1.27.
Description and experience gap. The comparison of description and each
experience blocks showed similar results as the overall analyses. There were main
effects for decision type, Fs(1, 31) > 48.91, p < .001, ηp2 > .612, and trial type, Fs(1, 31) >
35.09, ps < .001, ηp2 > .531. Between the two experience blocks, decision times of the
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decision trials were similar (1st: 610 ms, 2nd: 613 ms) but decision times of the catch
trials were reduced in the 2nd experience blocks (1st: 774ms; 2nd: 736 ms), F(1, 31) = 4.47,
p = .043, ηp2 = .126. No other terms were significant, Fs < 1.15.
Single Colored Star Trials
RT and percentage error (PE) of the 32 single colored star trials were submitted
to ANOVAs with 2 (delay block: 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) × 4 (colored star: green, red,
cyan, magenta) as within-subject factors. For the single colored star trials, the mean error
rate was 7.1% and mean RT was 660 ms. Mean RTs for the 8 s vs. 10 s temporal delay
block (M = 682 ms) was longer than that of the 2 s vs. 4 s block (M = 639 ms), F(1,31) =
6.66, p =.015, ηp2 = .177. RTs for cyan (M = 681 ms) and magenta (M = 677 ms) stars
tended to be longer than RTs for red (M = 648 ms) and green (M = 635 ms) stars, F(3, 93)
= 2.62, p = .062, ηp2 = .078. There was no interaction between delay and colored stars, F
< 1.0. Error rates showed no differences between delays or colors, Fs < 1.0.
Memory Test of Reward Amounts and Delays
Percentage of correct judgments of hypothetical reward amounts and delays for
decision trials and catch trials are depicted in Figure 11. Correct rate of the reward
amount estimation was 93.8% on average. Chi-squared tests showed that the recall of
reward amount was similar for all conditions, χ2(1) < 1.0. As expected, temporal interval
recall accuracy was better with prospective instructions in the second experience blocks
(89.1%) than with retrospective instructions in the first experience blocks (62.9%), χ2(1)
= 48.04, p < .001. Moreover, the improvement showed different patterns between
decision trials and catch trials, χ2(1) = 4.71, p = .030. For decision trials, the improvement
was more evident for the longer durations (59.4% • 96.9%, see the gap between dark

44
solid and dark dashed lines of decision trials in Figure 11) than for the shorter durations
(71.9% • 92.2%, see the gap between gray solid and gray dashed lines of decision trials
in Figure 11), χ2(1) = 31.56, p < .001. In contrast, for catch trials, the improvement was
more evident for shorter durations (53.1% • 90.6%, see the gap between gray solid and
gray dashed lines of catch trials in Figure 11) than for longer durations (67.2% •
76.6%, see the gap between dark solid and dark dashed lines of catch trials in Figure 11),
χ2(1) = 16.12, p < .001.
Altogether, the memory test results suggest that the difference between the two
experience blocks was mainly due to the temporal delays. With prospective instructions,
participants improved their estimation of delays, especially the longer ones for decision
trials, implying that they might be insensitive to longer durations when made decisions
initially. In contrast, for catch trials, better improvement was evident for shorter delays,
suggesting that catch trial errors may be because of participants’ inattentiveness to
shorter delays.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3, again, demonstrated the temporal discounting in the
decisions from description at the seconds time-level. However, this pattern was not
evident for decisions made from experience. Significant interactions between decisions
from description and decisions from the first experience blocks indicate a descriptionexperience gap for delayed rewards selection (see the left and center columns of Figure
8). When participants made decisions from experience in the first blocks, a preference
for larger/later rewards was evident regardless of temporal delay. Therefore, the
experienced temporal delays were not integrated with the rewards into one event file
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when both dimensions were presented as action effects, deviating from what is obtained
in the sensory action effect paradigm (e.g., Dignath et al., 2014; Janczyk et al., 2017).
The memory test of the first experience blocks revealed that participants had difficulty
recalling the temporal information that was incidentally encoded, supporting the
hypothesis that time perception may be a driver for the description-experience gap.
When participants were informed that they would be asked to recall the reward
amounts and the delays for the second experience blocks, participants improved their
estimation for longer temporal delays, particularly for decision trials. Nevertheless, the
improved estimation of temporal delays did not make the reward selection similar as the
results of decisions from description. In contrast, participants showed no preference for
either reward (see the right column of Figure 8). When the prospective instructions were
implemented after the retrospective instructions, participants seemed to not just pay
more attention to the temporal dimension. They were also motivated to focus more on
discriminating the difference within each delay pair to get better memory test results,
because they realized that their performance was not ideal on the prior memory test from
retrospective instructions. Since the difference between each pair of delays turned out to
be the same or similar, participants did not show preference for either reward.
Differences between decisions from description and experience were also
revealed in the results of catch trials and decision time. For catch trials, participants
made more errors when temporal delays information was obtained from experience than
from description. For decision time, participants took less time to make the selection
from experience than from the description. The combined results suggest that
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participants weighted the temporal dimension less for decisions from experience than
from description.
Taken together, the results of Experiment 3 provide extra evidence to support the
hypothesis that time perception may be a robust driver for temporal discounting and the
description-experience gap of delayed choice selection can be the result of perception
bias of longer duration.
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EXPERIMENT 4. DELAYED REWARD SELECTION FROM
DESCRIPTION VS. FROM EXPERIENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE
INSTRUCTIONS

Out of expectation, participants showed no preference between larger/later and
smaller/sooner rewards with prospective instructions in Experiment 3. Because the
prospective instructions were always implemented in the second experience blocks, the
obtained difference between the two experience blocks in Experiment 3 could also be
due to the presentation order of the instructions. To eliminate this impact of the
presentation order, Experiment 4 was conducted the same as Experiment 3, except
participants were informed of the memory test of reward amounts and the delays ahead.
Method
Participants
Another 32 participants (13 male; Mage= 19.0 years) were drawn from the same
subject pool as prior experiments, and informed consent was obtained for each
participant.
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure
All stimuli and apparatus were the same as Experiment 3. The experiment was
the same as Experiment 3 except that participants received the prospective instructions
ahead of each experience block.
Results
The average error rate of catch trials in the description blocks was 14.2%. No
participant was excluded from data analyses. Results were analyzed in the same way as
Experiment 3.
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Choice Data
Decision trials. Figure 12 plots the proportion of the larger/later rewards
selection of decision trials in the description and experience blocks. ANOVA was
conducted in the similar way as Experiment 3. Results revealed a main effect of reward
type, F(1,31) = 6.35, p = .017, ηp2 = .170, showing that the overall selection of the
larger/later rewards was larger (61.8%) than the smaller/sooner rewards (38%). The
interaction of reward type × delay block was also significant, F(1,31) = 15.09, p = .001,
ηp2 = .327. Like in Experiment 3, participants selected more larger/later rewards in the 8
s vs. 10 s delay (75.9%) than in the 2 s vs. 4 s delay (47.7%). This preference reversal
also varied between decision types, F(2,62) = 3.96, p = .027, ηp2 = .113, indicating a
description-experience gap.
Description and experience gap. The results of the description blocks were
compared to the results of each experience blocks. The description-experience gap was
evident between the description [selection of larger/later rewards: 38.3% (2 s vs. 4 s),
79.9% (8 s vs. 10 s)] and the 1st experience blocks [selection of larger/later rewards:
59.1% (2 s vs. 4 s), 78.2% (8 s vs. 10 s)], F(1,31) = 5.58, p = .025, ηp2 = .152, as well as
the description and the 2nd experience blocks [selection of larger/later rewards: 45.8%
(2 s vs. 4 s), 69.7% (8 s vs. 10 s)], F(1,31) = 4.97, p = .033, ηp2 = .138. But there was no
difference between the two experience blocks, F < 1.0.
Catch trials. Figure 13 plots the proportion of error selections of catch trials in
the description and experience blocks. Results were analyzed similarly as Experiment 3.
The average error rate of catch trials was 14.2% for description blocks but 43% for first
experience blocks and 27.4% for the second experience blocks. The difference between
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the decision types were significant, F(2,62) = 29.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .508. There was also a
main effect of temporal delay, F(1,31) = 7.35, p = .003, ηp2 = .202, showing fewer errors
for the short delays (21.5%) than for the longer delays (34.7%). And this pattern was
evident regardless of whether the decisions were from description or experience, F(2,62) =
1.34, p < .269, ηp2 = .044.
Description and experience gap. Compared to the results of description blocks,
the selection of smaller/later reward was increased in the first experience blocks, F(1,31)
= 47.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .603, and the second experience blocks, F(1,31) = 33.96, p < .001,
ηp2 = .523. But there was no difference between the two experience blocks (see Figure
13 center and right columns), F < 1.0. For larger/later reward, more errors were evident
for decisions from the first experience blocks than from description blocks, F(1,31) =
17.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .358, but no difference was obtained between the description and
the second experience blocks, F(1,31) = 2.45, p = .128, ηp2 = .073. The difference between
the two experience blocks was also significant, F(1,31) = 16.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .343. For
both error types, the results showed the same pattern as those of Experiment 3.
Decision Time
Figure 14 presents the results of mean decision time. Similar as prior
experiments, participants took longer time to select catch trials (910 ms) than decision
trials (730 ms), F(1, 31) = 98.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .760. The main effect of delay block was
also significant, F(1, 31) = 5.17, p = .030, ηp2 = .143. Choice selection for shorter temporal
delays was faster (782 ms) than for the longer delays (859 ms). Participants took more
time to make the selection from description than from experience, F(2, 62) = 77.24, p <
.001, ηp2 = .714. The 2-way interaction of decision type × temporal delay was
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significant, F(2, 62) = 4.50, p = .026, ηp2 = .127, indicating that the decision time
difference between temporal delays was more evident for decisions from description
than for decisions from experience, as shown by the bar-height difference between 2 s
vs. 4 s and 8 s vs. 10 s being larger for the description blocks than for the experience
blocks (see Figure 14).
Description and experience gap. For the description and the first experience
blocks, ANOVA showed that there were main effects for decision type (M = 1084 ms for
description blocks; M = 704 ms for first experience blocks), F(1, 31) = 71.23, p < .001, ηp2
= .697, trial type (M = 992 ms for catch trials; M = 796 ms for decision trials), F(1, 31) =
114.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .786, and delay block (M = 841 ms for 2 s vs. 4 s blocks; M = 945
ms for 8 s vs. 10 s blocks), F(1, 31) = 6.16, p = .019, ηp2 = .166. The interaction between
decision type × delay block was at .05 significance level, F(1, 31) = 3.90, p = .057, ηp2 =
.123.
Similarly, the decision times between description and the second experience
blocks also showed main effects of decision type, F(1, 31) = 91.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .746,
trial type, F(1, 31) = 84.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .732, and delay block, F(1, 31) = 5.29, p = .028,
ηp2 = .146. Again, the interaction between decision type × delay block was significant,
F(1, 31) = 6.43, p = .017, ηp2 = .172, suggesting less influence of temporal delays on
decisions from experience.
Decision times were shorter in the second experience blocks (672 ms) than in the
first experience blocks (705 ms), F(1, 31) = 5.36, p = .027, ηp2 = .147. And the decision
time reduction was more evident for the catch trials (first experience blocks: 796 ms,
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second experience blocks: 736 ms) than for the decision trials (first experience blocks:
595 ms, second experience blocks: 588 ms), F(1, 31) = 6.70, p = .015, ηp2 = .182.
Single Colored Star Trials
For the 32 single colored star trials, the mean error rate was 8.7% and mean RT
was 649 ms. Shorter RT was evident for short delays (630 ms) than for longer delays
(679 ms), F(1, 31) = 4.94, p = .034, ηp2 = .034. RT also differed between the four colors,
F(3, 93) = 8.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .223. RTs for cyan (M = 687 ms) and magenta (M = 689
ms) stars were longer than RTs for green (M = 626 ms) and red (M = 600 ms) stars. No
term involving error rates was significant, Fs < 1.0.
Memory Test of Reward Amounts and Delays
Proportion of correct judgments of hypothetical reward amounts and delays are
depicted in Figure 15. Correct rate of reward amount judgment was about 86% on
average. Chi-squared tests showed that the judgment results of reward amounts were
similar regardless of temporal delays or two experience blocks, χ2(1) < 1.0. The
estimation of temporal intervals became more accurate in the second experience blocks
(79.3%) than in the first experience blocks (61.7%), χ2(1) = 17.99, p < .001. The temporal
estimation improvement showed different patterns between trial types, χ2(1) = 17.21, p <
.001. Similar as Experiment 3, for decision trials, improvement was more evident for the
longer durations (62.5% • 84.4%, see the gap between dark solid and dark dashed lines
of decision trials in Figure 15) than for the shorter durations (68.8% • 76.6%, see the
gap between gray solid and gray dashed lines of decision trials in Figure 15), χ2(1) = 6.27,
p = .012. For catch trials, the improvement was evident for both shorter (65.6% •
84.4%, see the gap between gray solid and gray dashed lines of catch trials in Figure 15)
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and longer (50% • 71.9%, see the gap between dark solid and dark dashed lines of
catch trials in Figure 15) durations (ps < .031), but in a similar manner, χ2(1) < 1.0.
Discussion
When participants were explicitly informed that they would be asked to recall the
reward amounts and delays with prospective instructions, they were motivated to pay
more attention to the temporal dimension. However, participants’ initial reward
preference still showed a preference for larger/later rewards. The performance of the
memory test in the first experience blocks was similar to that of Experiment 3 in which
the retrospective instructions were implemented. Altogether, those results suggest that
attention is not sufficient to reduce a general insensitivity to temporal intervals,
especially for the longer durations.
When participants did the same task for the second time, the preference for the
larger/later rewards was reduced for decisions made from experience (78.2% • 69.7%).
Different from the gap obtained in Experiment 3, a preference for the larger/later
rewards was still evident, which was similar to the results of the first experience blocks
in Experiment 4. The estimation of temporal intervals was improved in the second
experience blocks but less than the improvement shown in Experiment 3. Therefore,
presenting prospective instructions after the first blocks as in Experiment 3 not only
made participants attend to the time dimension but may also have induced them to rely
more on the temporal information for their decisions.
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EXPERIMENT 5. DELAYED REWARD SELECTION FROM
DESCRIPTION VS. EXPERIENCE WITH EXTRA AUDITORY
ACTION EFFECT

To examine a more precise estimation of temporal delays on the influence of the
description-experience gap of delayed choice selection, an acoustic action effect was
played simultaneously with the two colored stars presentation in one of the experience
blocks. After two experience blocks in each temporal-delay section, participants were
asked to recall the amount and delay of each reward in decisions from experience.
Because participants were not informed of this judgment beforehand, the judgment was
retrospective in the first section but implicitly prospective in the second section.
Method
Participants
Another 32 participants (9 Female; Mage= 20.2 years) were drawn from the same
subject pool as prior experiments, and informed consent was obtained for each
participant.
Apparatus and Stimuli
All stimuli and apparatus were the same as Experiment 4 except as noted. A 200or 500-Hz tone about 60 dB was played for 200 ms as acoustic action effect for the
experience blocks. Auditory stimuli were presented via a headphone set. High error rates
were evident for catch trials in Experiments 3 and 4, suggesting the ineffectiveness of
single colored star trials included in experience blocks. Thus, the 8 single colored star
trials were excluded from the experience blocks. To make the experiment duration
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comparable with the prior ones, 40 trials were implemented in single colored star blocks
of action-effect learning.
Design and Procedure
The procedure was the same as Experiment 4 except as noted. In the single
colored star blocks, the low- and high-pitch tones were presented after reward selection
as acoustic action effects. The high-pitch tone was always associated with short
durations and the low-pitch tone was always associated with longer durations to reduce a
tendency of judging high-pitch tone longer than low-pitch tone (Allen, 1984).
Participants were told that the acoustic action effects were not critical to the single
colored blocks and could be ignored. In one experience block of each section, the lowor high-pitch tone was played simultaneously with the two colored stars presentation to
introduce precise estimation of temporal delays. The presentation order of the experience
blocks with acoustic action effects was the same between the two sections but was
counterbalanced between participants. There was only one retrospective instruction at
the end of the experience blocks in each section.
Results
The average error rate of catch trials in the description blocks was 12.6%. All
participants’ results were included for data analyses, and results were analyzed in a
similar way as Experiments 3 and 4.
Choice Data
Decision trials. Figure 16 plots the proportion of the larger/later reward
selections of decision trials in the description and experience blocks. Results showed a
main effect of reward type, F(1,31) = 7.14, p = .012, ηp2 = .187. The overall selection of
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the larger/later rewards was larger (64.1%) than the smaller/sooner rewards (35.6%).
The interaction of reward type × delay block was also significant, F(1,31) = 7.89, p =
.009, ηp2 = .203. As in prior experiments, participants selected more larger/later rewards
in the 8 s vs. 10 s delay block (71.3%) than in the 2 s vs. 4 s delay block (57%). Same as
Experiments 3 and 4, the 3-way interaction was significant, F(2,62) = 6.69, p = .003, ηp2 =
.178, indicating a description-experience gap. In addition, the 2-way interaction of
reward type × decision type was significant, F(2,62) = 7.79, p = .002, ηp2 = .201, as shown
by the proportions of the larger/later rewards selection being stable across the three
decision types but the selection ratios of the smaller/sooner rewards varying among
decision types.
Description and experience gap. The description-experience gap was evident
between the description [selection of larger/later rewards: 38.4% (2 s vs. 4 s), 71.6% (8
s vs. 10 s)] and the 1st experience blocks [selection of larger/later rewards: 73.3% (2 s
vs. 4 s), 69.6% (8 s vs. 10 s)] , F(1,31) = 10.60, p = .003, ηp2 = .255, as well as the
description and the 2nd experience blocks [selection of larger/later rewards: 59.1% (2 s
vs. 4 s), 72.7% (8 s vs. 10 s)], F(1,31) = 4.16, p = .050, ηp2 = .118. The difference between
the two experience blocks approached significance, F(1,31) = 3.55, p = .069, ηp2 = .103.
Acoustic action effect. Figure 17 plots the proportion of the larger/later reward
selections of decision trials in the description and experience blocks as a function of with
or without acoustic action effect. To examine the acoustic action effect, ANOVA was
also conducted with 2 (reward type: larger/later, smaller/sooner) × 2 (delay block: 2 s
vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) × 3 (decision type: description, with-tone experience, without-tone
experience) as within-subject factors. The 3-way interaction was significant, F(2,62) =
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4.34, p = .019, ηp2 = .123. Further analyses showed that the description-experience gap
was evident between the description [selection of larger/later rewards: 38.4% (2 s vs. 4
s), 71.6% (8 s vs. 10 s)] and the with-tone experience blocks [selection of larger/later
rewards: 69.6% (2 s vs. 4 s), 71.8% (8 s vs. 10 s)], F(1,31) = 6.73, p = .014, ηp2 = .178, as
well as the description and the without-tone experience blocks [selection of larger/later
rewards: 65.6% (2 s vs. 4 s), 70.5% (8 s vs. 10 s)], F(1,31) = 5.12, p = .031, ηp2 = .142. But
reward selection showed a similar pattern between the two experience blocks, F < 1.0.
Overall, a minimal impact of additional acoustic action effect was revealed.
Catch trials. The proportion of error selection in catch trials is plotted in Figure
18. The main effect of decision type was significant, F(2, 62) = 35.48, p < .001, #$% = .534.
Compared to the results of the description blocks (12.6%), larger error rates were evident
for the first (38.9%) and the second (39.6%) experience blocks. The main effect of error
type approached significance, F(1, 31) = 3.58, p = .068, #$% = .103. The larger/later error
rate (17.1%) tended to be greater than the smaller/later error rate (13.3%) .
Description and experience gap. Compared to the results of description blocks,
the selection of larger/later error was increased in both experience blocks, Fs(1,31) >
22.25, ps < .001, ηp2 > .418. Although there was no difference between the two
experience blocks, F < 1.0, the results between the two experience blocks varied
between delay blocks, F(1,31) = 6.75, p = .014, ηp2 = .179. In the 2 s vs. 4 s delay blocks,
the larger/latter error rate was reduced from the first to the second experience blocks but
an opposite pattern was revealed in the 8 s vs. 10 s delay blocks. Compared to the
description blocks, selection of smaller//later reward were also increased for both
experience blocks, Fs(1,31) > 36.22, ps < .001, ηp2 > .539. There was no difference
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between the two experience blocks, F(1,31) = 1.51, p = .229, ηp2 = .046, showing a similar
pattern as Experiments 3 and 4. For the catch trials in the experience blocks, the acoustic
action effect showed minimum influence; no term was significant, Fs < 2.75.
Decision Time
Decision time results showed a similar pattern as Experiments 3 and 4 (see
Figure 19). There were main effects of decision type, F(2, 62) = 62.79, p < .001, #$% = .669,
trial type, F(1, 31) = 61.03, p < .001, #$% = .663, and delay block, F(1, 31) = 7.89, p = .009,
#$% = .203. The 2-way interaction of decision type × delay block was also significant, F(2,
62)

= 4.16, p = .040, #$% = .118, as shown by the time difference between decision and

catch trials getting smaller across decision types (the description blocks: 203 ms; the first
experience blocks:73 ms, and the second experience blocks:10 ms).
Acoustic action effect. For the decision trials in the experience blocks, the
acoustic action effect showed a main effect, F(1, 31) = 8.41, p = .004, #$% = .123. RTs for
the acoustic presentation blocks (M = 671 ms) were longer than the blocks without
acoustic action effect (M = 614 ms). The 2-way interaction of temporal delay × acoustic
action effect was also significant, F(1, 31) = 9.13, p = .003, #$% = .123. RTs of the 8 s vs. 10
s delay blocks were not impacted by the acoustic action effect (Mw = 597 ms vs. Mw/o =
595 ms), whereas RTs of the 2 s vs. 4 s delay blocks became longer when acoustic action
effects were added (Mw = 746 ms vs. Mw/o = 631 ms).
Single Colored Star Trials
For the 40 single colored star trials, the mean error rate was 7.3% and mean RT
was 675 ms. As in Experiments 3 and 4, RTs for magenta (M = 725 ms) and cyan (M =
695 ms) colored stars were longer than that of red (M = 639 ms) and green (M = 645 ms)
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stars, F(3, 93) = 7.90, p < .001, #$% = .203. RTs were not different when the acoustic action
effect’s pitch was high (M = 677 ms) or low (M = 672 ms) or when the delays were 8 s
vs. 10 s (M = 679 ms) or 2 s vs. 4 s (M = 673 ms), Fs < 1.0. No main effects or
interactions were significant for error rates, Fs < 1.0.
Memory Test of Reward Amounts and Delays
Figure 20 plots the proportion of correct judgment of hypothetical reward amount
and temporal delay for the experience blocks. Post-session correct estimation of amount
showed a difference between retrospective and prospective (implicit) instructions, χ2(1) =
8.35, p = .003. No such kind of difference have been found in Experiments 3 and 4,
therefore the inclusion of a single colored trial in the experience blocks helped
participants to encode the reward amounts correctly. For the temporal delay judgment,
the overall performance was improved in the second section (52.1% • 72.1%), and only
the main effect of section (instructions) was significant, χ2(1) = 6.06, p = .014.
Discussion
When an extra acoustic action effect was added, the temporal estimation of the
affective action effect did not improve, as what has been shown in the action effect
learning literature (Hommel et al., 2017), suggesting that the sensory and affective action
effects are independent from each other. Implicit prospective instructions were
implemented for the second section. Although the recall of temporal delay and reward
amount were increased after a retrospective memory test, the reward preference in the
experience blocks still showed a preference for the larger/later rewards, suggesting a
robust perception bias to temporal durations during experience.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION

Typically, human behavior can be divided both temporally and functionally into
distinct processes. First, people assess the available options, attribute value to those
options, and form preferences among them (decision-making); second, they select,
initiate, and complete an action according to the preferences established during the first
stage; third, the individuals experience or evaluate the outcome or consequence of the
action compared to the expected outcome. The comparison results of stage 3 provide an
approach of linking actions to outcomes, which is critical to adjusting the values
attributed to options during the first stage of future choice behaviors.
Nevertheless, most research on temporal discounting has focused on decisions
made from description with relatively large-scale delays on the order of months or years
(e.g., Green et al., 2004), which only covers the first two stages described above. Using
the partial feedback paradigm in risky choice, the current series of experiments
examined preferences for delayed rewards at the seconds time-level for decisions made
from either description or experience, which extended the research to include the third
stage. In particular, roles of temporal interval perception, expected affective action
effect, and expected sensory action effect in selecting delayed rewards were examined.
In Experiments 1 and 2 participants selected their preferred delayed rewards
based on description. Temporal discounting was shown to describe the effect of delay on
the subjective value of a delayed reward at the seconds time-level. With the amounts of
rewards increased, the discounting function tended to be shallow but still statistically
significant. Although the temporal delays were only described in those two experiments,
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and not experienced, the decision times increased when the described delay increased,
suggesting difficulty at discriminating the same 2-s gap when the delays are longer.
In Experiment 3, when participants were asked to select their preferences based
on description and experience, a more complex picture emerged. For decisions made
from description, the temporal discounting as in Experiment 1 was evident. For
decisions made from experience, the temporal discounting became less: Participants
showed a preference for the larger reward regardless of delays, exhibiting the
description-experience gap. Nevertheless, when participants were informed prior to the
second experience blocks that they would receive a memory test of the reward amounts
and delays after completing the decision task, the proportions of choice selection of
larger/later and smaller/sooner were similar, showing no reward preference.
Experiment 4 was the same as Experiment 3 except that participants were
informed of the memory test at the beginning of the study. The description-experience
gap was evident for the first experience blocks, as in Experiment 3. The descriptionexperience gap was also evident in the second experience blocks, which showed a
different pattern if compared to Experiment 3. In Experiment 5, acoustic action effects
added to promote an accurate estimation of temporal intervals did not reduce the
description-experience gap of delayed reward selection for both experience blocks.
These experiments yielded four main results. First, there was a descriptionexperience gap for delayed rewards selection in the seconds time-level, implying that the
analysis of multiple types of information (e.g., temporal, affective) and the selection of
appropriate behavior in response to stimuli incorporate reference to memory of what has
been experienced or learned previously. Second, regardless of whether participants were
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led to expect a later memory test (prospective) or not (retrospective), the choices showed
a description-experience gap initially, suggesting that attention is not essential creating
the gap. Third, participants deviated from maximization and showed a bias against an
alternative (i.e., the smaller/sooner reward) that was risky in one experience (decision
trials) but not the other (catch trials). Fourth, there was no direct interaction between
sensory and affective action effects, in agreement with the previous findings that sensory
and affective action effects impact action selection in an additive fashion (Eder,
Rothermund, De Houwer, & Hommel, 2015; Hommel et al., 2017). In what follows, I
discuss those main results and their implications in detail. The discussion of the first two
results is combined since they are closely related to each other.
A Mental Number Line Account for the Description-Experience Gap
Temporal Interval Perception From Description
When participants made decisions on the basis of description, temporal delay
revealed a main effect (see the decision time results of Experiments 1 and 2, and the
description block results of Experiments 3 to 5). Decision times increased when the
temporal delay increased, indicating that people internally represented the delays and
took them into account when making decisions. When temporal delays increased (Now
vs. 2 s • 2 s vs. 4 s • 8 s vs. 10 s), the same 2-s gap discrimination seemed to become
more difficult, creating longer decision time. These results are in agreement with nonlinear representation of psychological time. In psychophysics, Stevens’s power law
(Stevens, 1957) and the Weber-Fechner logarithmic law (Fechner, 1860/1966) indicate
that people’s internal representation of magnitude for sensory (e.g., visual, auditory)
stimuli is nonlinear, with the impact of any given absolute amount of increase being a
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decreasing function of the base magnitude. In other words, a change in a stimulus’ value
at larger magnitude has less of a psychological effect than that at a smaller magnitude.
Mental time line. Consistent with the Weber-Fechner law, mental time has been
proposed to be represented along a spatial continuum akin to a line, where time flows
from one extremity (i.e., past) towards the other (future; Bonato, Zorzi, & Umiltà, 2012).
A given time or temporal interval is coded with respect to a reference point (typically
Now). Thus, along the mental time line, the perceived 2-s gap of shorter prospective
delays (e.g., 2 s vs. 4 s) is larger than the perceived 2-s gap of longer prospective delays
(e.g., 8 s vs. 10 s).
Prior studies have considered the role of psychological effects of time perception
in explanations of the temporal discounting function (e.g., Kim & Zauberman, 2009;
Zauberman, Kim, Malkoc, & Betterman, 2009). Zauberman et al. examined participants’
sensitivity to prospective duration estimation and the role of such time perception in the
temporal discounting function with varied temporal ranges (from 3 months to 36 months
in 3-month increments). To measure how subjective assessments of different prospective
time correspond to the changes in objective time, Zaubermanet al. used an intertemporal
task in which participants were asked to put a value on delaying an outcome (Thaler,
1981). They also asked participants to estimate the subjective time on a 180 mm line
with end points labeled “very short” on the left and “very long” on the right. Results
showed that participants were relatively insensitive to temporal delays. Their subjective
estimation of future time changed less than the corresponding change in objective time,
and the temporal discounting did not vary with the subjective time estimation,
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suggesting that subjective time insensitivity may explain the temporal discounting
behavior.
Kim and Zauberman (2009) proposed a perceived-time-based model and
demonstrated that two aspects of time perception are relevant to temporal discounting:
(1) diminishing sensitivity to longer time durations (i.e., nonlinearity, how long people
perceive short time durations relative to long time durations); (2) the overall level of
time contraction (i.e., how long or short people perceive time duration to be overall).
Results showed that participants’ degree of temporal discounting was positively
associated with level of contraction and negatively associated with diminishing
sensitivity.
Based on those findings, a perceived-time-based account was proposed to explain
the temporal discounting function from a cognitive perspective, in addition to the
perceived-value-based account from the affective perspective (Ainslie, 1975;
Loewenstein, 1996). A hyperbolic function has been proposed to explain psychological
time (Takahashi, 2011), which may induce the hyperbolic function obtained for temporal
discounting of reward, suggesting a time-based account.
However, prior studies mainly investigated the subjective time estimation in
month and year ranges (Zauberman et al., 2009) and indicated that the insensitivity may
have less predictive power for short durations (e.g., hour or days). In contrast to their
implication, the present study empirically demonstrated that the diminishing sensitivity
is evident for durations in the seconds time-level as well. The findings of this research
are potentially important because they suggest that the subjective insensitivity to
prospective duration is independent from time duration scale.
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Mental Number Line
Similar subjective insensitivity across years, months, and seconds time-level
indicates a similar structural representation of the mental time. Shepard, Kilpatric, and
Cunningham (1975) proposed a second-order isomorphism that exists in the relations
among different internal representations and in parallel between these relations and the
relations among the corresponding external representations. In their study, participants
rated similarities of all pairs of numbers 0 to 9 in 24 conditions. Those conditions
differed in the forms into which they were to be mentally transformed and then judged,
including visual forms of rows of dots, Arabic numerals, and auditory forms of spoken
English names. Similar ratings were found to depend entirely on the form in which the
numbers were to be judged and not at all on the form in which they were actually
presented. Since the prospective duration representation in the temporal discounting
literature is always through numbers, the similar subjective insensitivity across different
time scales (e.g., years, months, seconds) is probably not due to time per se but has its
basis in the logarithmic mental number line representation (Dehaene, 2003).
Mental number line with magnitude. Besides time information, reward
amounts in the temporal discounting research are also represented in the format of
numbers. The effect of amount on rate of temporal discounting (often referred to as the
magnitude effect), which is that smaller delayed rewards are discounted more steeply
than larger delayed rewards, has been shown in many studies of human decision making
involving both real and hypothetical monetary rewards (e.g., Green et al., 1994; Johnson
& Bikel, 2002). Various accounts have been proposed to explain the magnitude effect
shown by humans. For example, Thaler (1985) suggested that people have different
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“mental accounts” for different amounts of rewards. People consider smaller amounts of
money as “spending money” but larger amounts of money as “savings”. Individuals
postpone their consumption when waiting for smaller amounts of money, whereas they
postpone earning for interests when waiting for larger amounts of money. The
magnitude effect occurs because people are more willing to forgo earning interests than
consumption.
Although theories like “mental accounts” can explain why people show the
magnitude effect, the amounts and delays represented as numbers in prior temporal
discounting studies (description paradigm) suggest a parsimonious explanation. I
conjecture that the magnitude effect of temporal discounting is also rooted in people’s
mental number line representation. Take the rewards $3 vs. $4 and $15 vs. $20 used in
the current Experiments 1 and 2 for example, reward amounts of 3, 4, 15, and 20 are
internally represented through a mental number line with a reference point of 0.
Although the absolute difference between 3 and 4 is smaller than 15 and 20, the
perceived difference between 3 and 4 along the mental number line seems to be larger
than the perceived difference between 15 and 20. This reversal is due to the former being
close to the reference point (0) and the latter relatively farther away (Weber’s law).
Thus, the mental number line representation reduces the discriminability of larger
amounts in a similar way as the increase of temporal delays (2 s vs. 4 s • 8 s vs. 10 s),
which causes people to choose the larger amount more often and reduce the discounting
function.
An association of number magnitude representation and mental number line has
been examined in a growing literature, especially in a paradigm called the Spatial
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Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) effect (Dehaene, Bossini, Giraux,
1993; see Wood, Willmes, Nuerk, & Fischer, 2008, for a review). The SNARC effect is
investigated by means of parity (odd vs. even) judgment or magnitude comparison
(smaller or larger than a criterion, e.g., 5) tasks performed with a left or right response to
a centrally-presented single digit (1-4, 6-9). Faster responses are obtained when
relatively small digits (e.g., 3) correspond to the left response and relatively large digits
(e.g., 7) correspond to the right response, compared to an opposite relation of magnitude
and response. The interaction of response location and number magnitude (SNARC
effect), which emerges even when number magnitude is task-irrelevant (parity judgment
task), can be attributed to spatial correspondence between the number position on the
automatically activated mental number line and the spatial position of the response
(Dehaene et al., 1993; see Proctor & Cho, 2006 for an alternative account).
Recently, Xiong and Proctor (2017) tested a SNARC effect in a magnitude
comparison task with a 4-digit number set (year number, 2011-2014 and 2016-2019)
relative to the criterion of 2015. The SNARC effect was absent for the year-number
magnitude comparison [see Dehaene et al., (1993) for similar results for 2-digit stimuli
in parity judgment task]. Thus, even though the relative differences between year
numbers and single digits are identical and participants could have focused entirely on
the rightmost digit for their decision, the number magnitude comparison was based on
the whole number value (Tan & Dixon, 2011).
Mental number line with probability. Also, the use of number as frequency
(i.e., ordering of numerical format representation with a reference), such as 50 in 1000,
rather than probability, like .05 (normalized artificial reference class, percentage from 0
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to 1), facilitates people’s cognitive processing, improving their performance on
statistical reasoning and risk decision-making (Reimer, Jones, & Skubisz, 2014).
Gigerenzer (1991) argued that the benefit of presenting risk numerically coincides with
cognitive mechanisms innately in place in human mind, which I conjecture to be the
mental time line.
Reward amounts and delays represented in numbers play a decisive role on the
obtained temporal discounting function. A mental number line, in which numbers are
represented in a continuous and logarithmic format, is more than a simple metaphor but
has a spatial nature and striking functional isomorphism to physical lines (Zorzi, Priftis,
& Umiltà, 2002).
Time Perception From Experience
In contrast to decisions from description, temporal discounting was not evident
for the decisions from experience, regardless of whether there was a retrospective or
prospective duration judgment. The results suggest that a lack of attention to the
temporal dimension is not the key to the description-experience gap. Also, the temporal
duration estimation results for the first experience blocks were similar between
Experiments 3 and 4, indicating that individuals are insensitive to time duration and
experience difficulty in estimating temporal delays.
After the retrospective memory test of the first experience blocks, participants
showed no reward preference in the second experience blocks of Experiment 3. Such
“within-subject” manipulation seems not only to have increased participants’ attention to
the temporal dimension but also their sensitivity to durations. Prior studies of delayed
decisions on the basis of description also revealed such increased sensitivity. Ebert and
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Prelec (2007, Experiment 1) asked participants to indicate their preference for delayed
rewards using a between- and within-subject presentation of five future times (in 1 day,
in 1 week, in 1 month, in 3 month, and in 1 year). Compared to the between-subject
conditions, participants in the within-subject condition were more time-sensitive and
paid more attention to the absolute gap between delays, as shown by reduced
discounting for the near future and increased discounting for the far future (see also
Wittman & Paulus, 2007).
In Experiment 4, participants were informed in advance that they would receive a
memory test. So participants kept the same task set across the first and second
experience blocks. Instead of varying time sensitivity, participants improved the
accuracy of their temporal interval estimations in the second blocks through practice,
which reduced the preference for the larger/later reward but not the descriptionexperience gap.
Similar to time perception from description, time perception from experience
also seems to have roots in the mental time line, suggesting a mental number line
account to explain the temporal discounting and the description-experience gap.
Mental number line for risky choice. Taking a step further, I also conjecture
this mental number line account explains the probability discounting and the descriptionexperience gap. Specifically, for risk choice selection from description, both options’
probabilities are stated explicitly. Within such setting, people represent a probability line
with a reference point of probability of 1, which extends further to 0. When both
rewards’ probabilities are high, such as $3 for sure and $4 with probability of 0.8, people
prefer $3 for sure because it is closer to the reference point, similar as the preference for
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smaller/sooner rewards when there is a short delay (Note that higher probability equals
to shorter probabilities waiting). When both rewards’ probabilities are decreased, such as
$4 with probability of 0.2 and $3 with probability of 0.25, probabilities of 0.2 and 0.25
are further along the probability number line and harder to discriminate. Therefore,
participants prefer $4 with probability of 0.2.
Besides, with a starting point of 1, the relative differences of smaller amounts
between higher (closer) and lower (farther) probabilities are less if compared to the
relative differences of larger amounts between higher (closer) and lower (farther)
probabilities. Therefore, this mental number line account can also explain the the reverse
magnitude effect obtained for probability discounting, for which people discount a
smaller amount less steeply than a larger amount by decreasing its probability (Green et
al., 1999; Green & Myerson, 2004).
When people make risky choice selection from experience, no probability
information is presented initially. Therefore, people represent the probability number
line with a start point of 0, which extends further to 1. When people experience $3 for
sure and $4 with probability of 0.8, they would prefer $4 with probability of 0.8 because
both probabilities are further away and people rely more on the reward amount. In
contrast, when both probabilities decreased, such as $4 with probability of 0.2 and $3
with probability of 0.25, people will choose the safe option $3 with probability of 0.25.
This mental number line account explains why people are relatively insensitive to
longer temporal intervals, which extends the perceived time account for temporal
discounting. The mental number line account also explains the similar results obtained
among different time scales (e.g., year, month, week, seconds). Although minutes time-
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level was not examined in the current study, similar results to those obtained for the
seconds time-level are predicted due to the basis on the mental representation of
numbers. This mental number line account also seems to accommodate what has been
found for probability discounting and the description-experience gap for risky choice,
providing a parsimonious explanation.
The Hot Stove Effect
Across Experiments 3 to 5, error rates of catch trials were higher for decisions
from experience than for decisions from description. Scrutiny of the errors revealed that
participants made the most errors on selecting smaller/later rewards. In the catch trials
of experience blocks, a smaller/later reward (presented as magenta or cyan colored stars)
was always paired with a smaller/sooner reward (presented as green or red colored
stars). The outcomes of the smaller/sooner rewards were notable through the 8 singlestar trials included in the experience blocks. When participants made decisions from
experience, they showed a preference for larger/later rewards, which introduced a bias
against choosing the pairwise smaller/sooner rewards. Thus, when smaller/sooner
rewards were paired with smaller/later rewards in catch trials, participants
misrepresented the value of smaller/sooner rewards on the basis of experience from the
decision trials and exhibited behavior that looks like risk aversion and resistance to
change, showing a strong “hot stove” effect (Denrell, 2007; Denrell & March, 2001).
The hot stove effect was first introduced by Mark Twain with his observation that if a
cat jumped on a hot stove, then she would never jump on a stove again, hot or cold.
With prospective instructions, the accuracies of reward amounts and temporal
delays estimation were increased in the second experience blocks of Experiments 3 and
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4. Consequently, errors of selecting larger/later rewards were reduced for the catch
trials, which showed no statistical difference from the results of the description blocks.
Therefore, errors of choosing larger/later rewards in catch trials were mainly due to
participants’ inaccurate representations of the longer temporal delays in the experience
blocks.
In contrast, the error rates of selecting smaller/later rewards were not reduced,
indicating that the bias was not due to an inaccurate representation of the reward delays.
The hot stove effect has been explained as a natural consequence of inherent asymmetry
between the effects of good and bad experiences (Ben-Elia, Erev, & Shiftan, 2008). The
consistent selection of smaller/later rewards suggests that participants may still treat the
selection of smaller/sooner as a “bad” experience even if they chose more
smaller/sooner rewards in the second experience blocks. The stronger and lasting effect
of “bad” experience is in line with the law of effect (Thorndike, 1898), according to
which “bad” consequences are expected to reduce the probability that the choice will be
repeated.
The hot stove effect has been mainly investigated in probabilistic decision
making from experience (Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron, 2005; Fujikawa, 2009),
in which participants have to learn about the outcome distributions through sampling as
they are not explicitly provided with prior information on the payoff structure. Using a
partial feedback paradigm, the current study revealed a strong hot-stove effect for
delayed reward selection as well, indicating its importance in analyzing decisions from
experience in general.
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Representation of Expected Sensory and Affective Action Effects
For decision made from description, expected reward amounts and delays were
explicitly stated. Participants took both aspects into consideration, represented them
internally, and made their decisions and selected the intended actions. Temporal
discounting functions were evident across all experiments at the seconds time-level, in
agreement with the results obtained in years and month time-levels previously. This
finding implies some commonality between the time scales that have been distinguished
to describe human behavior (Newell, 1994, p.122).
Besides delayed rewards preferences, decision times consistently increased as a
function of temporal delay. Longer decision time implies that the decisions became
harder when temporal delays were increased. Nevertheless, the percentage of catch-trial
errors was similar across all the delays, suggesting similar difficulty levels. Another
possibility is that the temporal durations were simulated through imaging the experience
of receiving the delayed rewards. Therefore, decision times varied as a function of the
temporal delay, consistent with the ideomotor theory (Shin et al., 2010).
For decisions made from experience, the reward amounts (affective effects) were
presented after the delays that can only be accessed through memory of past experience.
A description-experience gap was evident. The results were clear: Participants showed
an overall preference for larger rewards (first experience blocks of Experiments 3-5),
suggesting that the temporal duration linking an action to its effect was not integrated
into an event file. Across Experiments 3-5, the interaction of reward type × delay block
differed between description and each experience block, indicating that temporal delays
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were not automatically retrieved during response selection in the experience blocks. It is
obvious that participants placed more weighting on reward amounts for their decisions.
Post-task memory test showed that participants’ discriminations of temporal
intervals were not ideal in general. Also, the discrimination for the 8 s vs. 10 s delays
tended to be worse than that for the 2 s vs. 4 s delays. With prospective memory
instructions, the overall performance increased, but the discrimination patterns were
similar. Thus, the overall preference of larger rewards in the 8 s vs. 10 s delays could be
explained by the duration estimation being less accurate for longer intervals than for
shorter intervals (Allan & Gibbon, 1991). In Experiment 4, participants were informed
of memory tests in advance. The discrimination of the 2 s vs. 4 s delays tended to be
better, and participants chose more smaller/sooner rewards in those blocks. Thus,
instead of not integrating the temporal interval, another possibility to explain the
description-experience gap is that participants did integrate the temporal interval but
with inaccurate estimations. The extra acoustic action effect added in Experiment 5
played a minimal role in increasing accurate recall of the experienced action-effect
association.
Limitations
The present laboratory experiments differed in several ways from real-world
delayed rewards decision-making. First, the rewards were hypothetical rather than
actual. However, previous studies have found no difference between real and
hypothetical rewards in delay discounting decision tasks (Johnson & Bickel, 2002).
Second, the experimental procedural used in this study was designed to minimize
procedural differences between the two types of decisions. For example, the same
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outcome values were used and the two types of decisions were altered in blocks. Thus, it
is possible that participants were aware that they were making the same decisions in both
paradigms, which may have induced the participants to be more consistent in their
delayed rewards preferences across decisions from description and experience. Third,
participants were undergraduate introductory psychology students, who may differ from
older adults who have considerably more delay-rewards selection experience. Any of
these factors could limit the generalizability of the results obtained here and their
implications. However, the notable regularity of the results, their consistency with
previous findings, and their conformance with reasonable and intuitively plausible
interpretations make them a suitable reference point in the development of a
comprehensive theory of delayed decision-making and action selection.
Directions for Future Research
A possible direction for future studies is to evaluate the description-experience
gap of delayed loss compared to reward. Prior research revealed that delayed loss is less
steeply time-discounted (i.e., more slowly) than the delayed gain, showing what is
known as the sign effect (i.e., gain is more steeply time-discounted than loss, Thaler,
1981). The sign effect has been attributed to the asymmetry of subjective valuation
between gain and loss (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992), consistent with the prospect theory
for risky choice that people have different sensitivities to gain and loss (i.e., loss is
psychologically valued to be greater than gain), referred to as “loss aversion”
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). However, when people make decisions from experienced
outcomes, they become more risk seeking for gains than for losses (e.g., Ludwig &
Spetch, 2011) and show a reversed trend to be more risk averse for gains than for losses.
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Thus, the delayed loss selection from description and experience needs to be examined
to determine whether it also shows a reversal as obtained for risky choices.
Many everyday choices involve outcomes that are both delayed and uncertain.
For example, if one makes a financial investment, there is the possibility, but not
guarantee, that it will pay off in the future. Similarly, if one choose to smoke cigarettes,
there is a chance that one will get cancer later on but that is not certain. Choices may
become even more difficult as the number of dimensions increase. Previous studies have
focused on the discounting of delayed and probabilistic rewards separately (Green et al.,
2004). Few studies have examined discounting varying both delays and probabilities
(Vanderveldt, Green, & Myerson, 2015; Yi, de la Piedad, & Bickel, 2006) and have
mainly focused on decisions from description. The description and experience paradigm
used in this dissertation can be applied to understand the description and experience gap
when gain and loss are both delayed and probabilistic. The paradigm can also be applied
to a number of daily-life problems. For example, in the cybersecurity field, privacy
violation, password leakage, and email credential disclosure are always probabilistic and
delayed. Future studies can focus on investigating how delay and risk together influence
people’s decision in these specific situations and how to boost privacy and security in an
environment that is ubiquitously connected.
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CONCLUSION

The current study provided evidence for temporal discounting at the seconds
time-level. A description-experience gap of delayed rewards preferences was also
revealed. People discounted a reward as the time to its receipt increased in decisions
from description but not decisions from experience, and this description-experience gap
was uninfluenced by sensory action effects but by how people encode and represent the
temporal information. These results indicate that people’s relative insensitivity to
temporal durations, specifically longer ones, contributed to temporal discounting.
This study first developed a partial-feedback paradigm to investigate the
description-experience gap of delayed rewards selection in a laboratory setting, making a
methodological contribution. In terms of theoretical contribution, a mental number line
account was proposed to explain the temporal discounting function and the descriptionexperience gap. People represent the reward amounts and delays along a mental number
line, in which numbers are represented in a continuous and non-linear format with a
starting point of 0. According to this account, the preference reversal of delayed reward
was mainly due to the discrimination difficulty of longer delays, which makes people
rely more on the reward amounts for their decisions. The mental number line account
also explains the steeper discounting function obtained for smaller amounts than for
larger amounts. The mental number line may be a fundamental representation that also
explains the probability discounting and the description-experience gap, which should be
tested in future studies.
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APPENDIX FIGURES

Figure 1. Delayed preference reversal, also called temporal discounting functions.
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; for a review, see Green & Myerson, 2004). The vertical
axis represents the subjective value of a future reward and the horizontal axis represents
time. The heights of the bars represent the actual reward amount. The curves show how
the subjective values might change as a function of time at which the reward were
evaluated. At Time 1 (T1) when the perceived time difference between two options is
relatively small, one would choose the larger/later (LL) reward; if the same choices
between smaller/sooner (SS) and the larger/later (LL) rewards are offered at Time 2
(T2), one would choose the smaller/sooner (SS) reward since the perceived time
difference is relatively large. From Green, L., & Myerson, J. (2004) A discounting
framework for choice with delayed and probabilistic rewards. Psychological Bulletin,
130, 769-792. Reprinted with permission.
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Figure 2. Proportion of larger/later reward selection of decision trials as a function of
delay block (Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) for Experiment 1. Error bars represent
±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for
within-subject variables.

89

Figure 3. Proportion of error selection of catch trials as a function of error type
(Larger/Later, Smaller/Later) and delay block (Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) for
Experiment 1. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on
Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 4. Mean decision time as a function of trial type (Decision trials, Catch trials) and
delay block (Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) for Experiment 1. Error bars represent
±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for
within-subject variables.
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Figure 5. Proportion of larger/later reward selection of decision trials as a function of
delay block (Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) for Experiment 2. Error bars represent
±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for
within-subject variables.
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Figure 6. Proportion of error selection of catch trials as a function of error type
(Larger/Later, Smaller/Later) and delay block (Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) for
Experiment 2. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on
Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 7. Mean decision time as a function of trial type (Decision trials, Catch trials)
and delay block (Now vs. 2 s, 2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) for Experiment 2. Error bars
represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method
for within-subject variables.
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Figure 8. Proportion of larger/later reward selection of decision trials as a function of
delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) and decision type [Description, Experience 1st
(retrospective instructions), Experience 2nd (prospective instructions)] for Experiment 3.
Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s
(2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 9. Proportion of error selection of catch trials as a function of error type
(Larger/Later, Smaller/Later) and decision type [Description, Experience 1st
(retrospective instructions), Experience 2nd (prospective instructions)] for each delay
block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) in Experiment 3. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of
the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 10. Mean decision time as a function of delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) and
decision type [Description, Experience 1st (retrospective instructions), Experience 2nd
(prospective instructions)] for each trial type (Decision trials, Catch trials) of Experiment
3. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s
(2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 12. Proportion of larger/later reward selection of decision trials as a function of
delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) and decision type [Description, Experience 1st
(prospective instructions), Experience 2nd (prospective instructions)] for Experiment 4.
Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s
(2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 13. Proportion of error selection of catch trials as a function of error type
(Larger/Later, Smaller/Later) and decision type [Description, Experience 1st (prospective
instructions), Experience 2nd (prospective instructions)] for each delay block (2 s vs. 4 s,
8 s vs. 10 s) in Experiment 4. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean
calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 14. Mean decision time as a function of delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) and
decision type [Description, Experience 1st (prospective instructions), Experience 2nd
(prospective instructions)] for each trial type (Decision trials, Catch trials) of Experiment
4. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s
(2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 16. Proportion of larger/later reward selection of decision trials as a function of
delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) and decision type (Description, Experience 1st,
Experience 2nd) for Experiment 5. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean
calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 17. Proportion of larger/later reward selection of decision trials as a function of
delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) and decision type [Description, Experience_w_tone
(with acoustic action effect), Experience_w/o_tone (without acoustic action effect)] for
Experiment 5. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on
Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subject variables.
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Figure 18. Proportion of error selection of catch trials as a function of error type
(Larger/Later, Smaller/Later) and decision type (Description, Experience 1st, Experience
2nd) for each delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) in Experiment 5. Error bars represent
±1 standard error of the mean calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for
within-subject variables.
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Figure 19. Mean decision time as a function of delay block (2 s vs. 4 s, 8 s vs. 10 s) and
decision type (Description, Experience 1st, Experience 2nd) for each trial type (Decision
trials, Catch trials) for Experiment 5. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean
calculated based on Cousineau’s (2005) method for within-subject variables.
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